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Abstract
We use a two-sector neoclassical open economy model with traded and non-traded
goods to investigate both the aggregate and the sectoral effects of temporary fiscal
shocks. One central finding is that both sectoral capital intensities and labor supply
elasticity matter in determining the response of key economic variables. In particular,
the model can produce a drop in investment and in the current account, in line with em-
pirical evidence, only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector, and labor is supplied elastically. Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a fis-
cal shock raises the relative size of the non-traded sector substantially in the short-run.
Additionally, allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors, the
two-sector model can produce the real exchange rate depreciation found in the data.
Finally, markup variations triggered by firm entry modify substantially the response of
the real wage and the sectoral composition of GDP in the short-run.
Keywords: Non-traded Goods; Fiscal Shocks; Investment; Current Account.
JEL Classification: F41, E62, E22, F32.
∗Romain Restout wishes to express his gratitude to the Belgian Federal Government for its financial
support (Grant PAI P6/07 on “Economic Policy and Finance in the Global Economy: Equilibrium Anal-
ysis and Social Evaluation”). Corresponding author: Olivier Cardi. Address correspondence: Universite´
Panthe´on-Assas Paris 2, ERMES, 12 Place du Panthe´on, 75230 Paris Cedex 05. France. Phone: +33 1
44 41 89 73. Fax: +33 1 40 51 81 30. E-mail: olivier.cardi@u-paris2.fr. Address correspondence: Romain
Restout, Universite´ catholique de Louvain (UCL), IRES, 3 place Montesquieu, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve,
Belgium. Phone: +32 10 47 39 89. E-mail address: romain.restout@uclouvain.be.
1 Introduction
There has recently been a revival of interest among policy makers in the fiscal policy tool.
The fiscal transmission mechanism has also attracted considerable attention in the academic
literature. A number of papers have explored the ability of quantitative business cycle
models, both of the neoclassical and of the new Keynesian variety, to account for the data,
see Burnside, see e.g. Eichenbaum and Fisher [2004] and Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
[2007], respectively. However, most of the analyses have been confined to closed economy
models and to one-sector frameworks. In the present paper we take up the following question
instead: to what extent can an open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical model
account for the time-series evidence on fiscal policy transmission mechanism?
Assuming that government spending is predetermined relative to the other variables
included in the vector autoregression (VAR) model, as suggested by Blanchard and Perotti
[2002], Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] establish a first set of main findings: an exogenous increase
in government spending raises output, and lowers both investment and the current account.1
The second set of main findings relates to the labor market. Perotti [2007] documents an
increase in hours worked and in the real wage.2 The third empirical fact relates to the
impact of fiscal shocks on the sectoral composition of output. Estimates by Be´ne´trix and
Lane [2010] reveal that a boost to government spending benefits disproportionately the
non-traded sector. The fourth empirical fact relates to the shift in the relative price of
home goods. Monacelli and Perotti [2010] and Enders et al. [2011] find that government
spending yields a real exchange rate depreciation.3
To address these empirical evidence, we use an open economy with a traded and a
non-traded sector. Our neoclassical framework builds on Turnovsky and Sen [1995] and
Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003]. Like Coto-Martinez and Dixon, we allow for the non-
traded sector to be imperfectly competitive. Our work differs from that of Turnovsky and
Sen [1995] and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] in one major respect.4 They consider the
1Such findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Corsetti and Mu¨ller [2006], Beetsma,
Giuliodori and Klaassen [2008], and Monacelli and Perotti [2010].
2While Perotti’s [2007] conclusions are in line with those of Rotemberg and Woodford [1992] and Pappa
[2009] for the U.S., Ramey [2011] finds that hours worked increase but real wages can rise or decline on
impact, depending on the period considered. Yet, in both cases, the real wage exceed its initial level after
two years.
3The sample of countries considered by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], Perotti [2007], Monacelli and Perotti
[2010], comprises four countries: the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia. In Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], the
period runs from 1980:1 to 2007:4, in Perotti [2007] from 1954:1 to 2003:1 for the U.S., and in Monacelli and
Perotti [2010] from 1980:1 to 2006:4. Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010] consider a panel of eleven member countries
of the euro area over the period 1970-2005. All these papers adopt the identification procedure of fiscal
shocks developed by Blanchard and Perotti [2002].
4Turnovsky and Sen [1995] investigate the effects of permanent government spending shocks by assuming
fixed labor supply. Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] introduce an elastic labor supply but restrict their
analysis to the effects of a permanent rise in public spending by assuming that the traded sector is more
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effects of permanent fiscal shocks while we examine the impact of temporary fiscal shocks
of different degrees of persistence. Beyond the fact that considering a transitory increase
in public spending allows us to address the VAR evidence, the effects of temporary fiscal
shocks can be different to those of a permanent shock.5
One attractive feature of a two-sector model with tradable and non tradable goods
is to cover both the closed economy and the open economy dimensions of contemporary
industrialized countries. In particular, the empirical evidence shows that the non-tradable
content of GDP and employment is substantial, at around two-thirds.6 From an analytical
point of view, as in a closed economy model, capital accumulation clears the home good
market, see e.g., Baxter and King [1993]. As in a small open economy, external borrowing
allows households to smooth consumption intertemporally. A second key feature of our
framework is that we can investigate the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks. Such a sectoral
decomposition of output is pivotal to understanding the fiscal transmission mechanism in an
open economy. In particular, such a model enables us to connect sectoral output responses
to the trade balance adjustment. Third, we are able to address the depreciation in the real
exchange rate which has recently been documented in the empirical literature.
Beyond the relevancy of a two-sector model for investigating the fiscal transmission
mechanism, such a framework can accommodate most of the empirical evidence mentioned
above, albeit under certain conditions. By contrast, the open-economy version of Baxter
and King’s [1993] model fails to account for the first set of observations, particularly for the
simultaneous decline of investment and the current account in response to an exogenous and
temporary increase in government spending, see e.g., Karayalc¸in [1999].7 As stressed in the
classic paper by Baxter and King [1993], a representative household responds to the higher
tax burden (which we assume to be lump-sum) by lowering consumption and increasing
labor supply. This raises the return on capital and triggers a rise in investment, which, in
turn, drives the current account into deficit. Furthermore, as the marginal product of labor
falls dramatically, the real wage fails to exceed its initial value during the transition.
One prominent feature of the time series of government spending is that its non tradable
content is substantial, at around 90%.8 We therefore concentrate on the effects of a rise
in public purchases of non-traded goods. We find that a two-sector model with traded
capital intensive. Additionally, neither Turnovsky and Sen [1995] nor Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] solve
the model numerically.
5The reason behind this result is that after a temporary fiscal shock, consumption falls much less than
after a permanent fiscal shock due to consumption smoothing behavior. Hence, if the traded sector is more
capital intensive, an excess demand (rather than excess supply) arises in the non-traded good market so
that investment is crowded out rather than being crowded in as long as the shock is transitory.
6Non tradable proportions are given in Table 3 (see Appendix A).
7Karaylalc¸in [1999] analyzes the effects of permanent and temporary fiscal shocks by using an open
economy version of the Baxter and King’s [1993] model. Regardless of its persistence, a fiscal expansion
triggers an investment boom and a current account deficit.
8The non-tradable content of government spending is reported in Table 3 for thirteen OECD countries.
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and non-traded goods can accommodate the two first sets of empirical findings, with the
exception of the rising real wage, as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than
the non-traded sector. The explanation is intuitive. Following a fiscal expansion, agents
cut real expenditure and raise labor supply. In contrast to a small open economy model,
investment clears the home goods (or non-traded goods) market. Assuming that the traded
sector is more capital intensive, an excess demand arises in the non-traded goods market
which triggers a drop in investment. In addition, according to Rybczynski’s theorem, higher
labor supply produces a fall in traded output which in turn lowers net exports and thereby
drives the current account into deficit. Assuming that the non-traded sector is more capital
intensive, the real exchange rate appreciates which shifts resources towards the non-traded
sector so that investment is crowded in while the current account enters in deficit as a result
of the fall in traded output.
We also estimate numerically the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks to address the third
empirical fact outlined above. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, a temporary fiscal
shock benefits the non-traded sector substantially in the short-run, in line with the empirical
evidence reported by Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010]. Furthermore, our numerical results show
that, in the long run, GDP growth is mostly driven by expansion in the traded output.
The steady-state rise in traded output is necessary to compensate for the short-run current
account deficits.
Keeping the markup fixed, the predictions of the two-sector model run counter to two
of the stylized facts outlined above: the real wage does not rise and the real exchange
rate does not depreciate, irrespective of whether the traded sector is more or less capital
intensive than the non-traded sector. To address the real exchange rate depreciation and
the increase in the real wage following government spending shocks, we follow Jaimovich
and Floetotto [2008] in allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Considering that only a
limited number of intermediate good producers operate in the non-traded sector, the price-
elasticity of demand and thereby the markup faced by each firm depends on the number of
competitors.9 As the rise in government spending is expected to boost non-traded output,
a fiscal shock triggers the entry of new firms. Hence, the markup falls, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities. If the traded sector is more capital intensive, the real exchange rate must
depreciate so that the return on domestic capital equalizes the return on foreign bonds. By
exerting a positive influence on the wage rate and triggering a depreciation in the real
exchange rate, the decline in the markup can boost the real wage, although only under
certain circumstances. More precisely, the cumulative response of the real wage rate two
years after the fiscal shock becomes positive only if the fiscal shock is either short-lived
or long-lived.10 If the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the real exchange must
9Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] consider the case of a fixed markup rather than an endogenous markup.
10A long-lived and a short-lived fiscal shock last 32 quarters and 8 quarters, respectively. In the baseline
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appreciate to equalize the return on domestic and foreign assets. As a consequence, the
real wage falls dramatically and remains below its original level over the transition towards
the steady-state.
Closely related to our paper is the study by Ramey and Shapiro [1998] who simulate a
two-sector neoclassical model with costly capital reallocation. In a similar spirit, we achieve
a better understanding of aggregate effects of fiscal shocks by investigating sectoral effects.
In contrast to our study, they consider a closed economy so that they do not address
the behavior of the current account or the real exchange rate. In addition, they do not
discuss the role of sectoral capital intensities. Finally, whereas Ramey and Shapiro analyze
the implications of costly capital mobility, we rather conduct a sensitivity analysis with
respect to the duration of the fiscal shock and the elasticity of labor supply, considering a
traded sector alternatively more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector, and
contrasting the case of a fixed markup with that of an endogenous markup.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification
of a two-sector model with traded and non-traded goods. Section 3 provides an analytical
exploration of the short-run and long-run effects of fiscal shocks. In section 4, we report the
results of our numerical simulations and discuss the sectoral effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion. Section 5 explores the case of an endogenous markup quantitatively, focusing
on the reactions of the real exchange rate and the real wage. In Section 6, we summarize
our main results and present our conclusions.
2 The Framework
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical
households and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever.11 The country is small in
terms of both world goods and capital markets, and faces a given world interest rate, r?. A
perfectly competitive sector produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can
be exported and consumed domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non-
traded good denoted by the superscriptN which is devoted to physical capital accumulation
and domestic consumption.12 The traded good is chosen as the numeraire.13
scenario, the fiscal shock lasts 16 quarters, in line with estimates by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] for the U.S.
Ramey [2011] also find that a fiscal shock lasts 4 years.
11More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided
in an Appendix which is available from the authors on request.
12As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not affect the
results (qualitatively). Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004], we find that the non tradable content of
investment accounts for the lion’s share of total investment expenditure (averaging to 60%).
13The price of the traded good is determined on the world market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
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2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non-traded goods
denoted by CT and CN , respectively, which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of
substitution function:
C
(
CT , CN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
CT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (CN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
where ϕ is the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle
(0 < ϕ < 1) and φ is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) of this unit as
labor, while the remainder, l ≡ 1 − L, is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time,
households derive utility from their consumption and experience disutility from working.
Households decide on consumption and worked hours by maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σC
C(t)1−
1
σC − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σC > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, and σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Factor income is derived by supplying labor L at a wage rate W , and capital K at a
rental rate rK . In addition, households accumulate internationally traded bonds, B(t), that
yield net interest rate earnings of r?B(t). Denoting lump-sum taxes by Z, the households’
flow budget constraint can be written as:
B˙(t) = r?B(t) + rK(t)K(t) +W (t)L(t)− Z − PC (P (t))C(t)− P (t)I(t), (3)
where PC is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non-
traded goods P . The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which includes
purchases of consumption goods and investment expenditure PI. Aggregate investment
gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the dynamic equation
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t), (4)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK . In the rest of this paper, the
time-argument is suppressed to increase clarity.
Denoting the co-state variable associated with eq. (3) by λ the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
C = (PCλ)
σC , (5a)
L =
(
λ
γL
W
)σL
, (5b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (5c)
rK
P
− δK + P˙
P
= r?, (5d)
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plus the appropriate transversality conditions. In an open economy model with a represen-
tative agent having perfect foresight, a constant rate of time preference and perfect access
to world capital markets, we impose β = r? in order to generate an interior solution. This
standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth, λ,
will undergo a discrete jump when individuals receive new information and must remain
constant over time from thereon, i.e. λ = λ¯.
The homogeneity of C(.) allows a two-stage consumption decision: in the first stage,
consumption is determined, and the intratemporal allocation between traded and non-
traded goods is decided at the second stage. Applying Shephard’s lemma gives CT =
(1− αC)PCC and PCN = αCPCC, with αC being the share of non-traded goods in the
consumption expenditure.
2.2 Firms
Both the traded and non-traded sectors use physical capital, KT and KN , and labor, LT
and LN , according to constant returns to scale production functions, Y T = F
(
KT , LT
)
and Y N = H
(
KN , LN
)
, which are assumed to have the usual neoclassical properties of
positive and diminishing marginal products. Both sectors face two cost components: a
capital rental cost equal to rK , and a labor cost equal to the wage rate W . The traded
sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive. As described in more details below, the
non-traded sector contains a large number of industries and each industry is comprised of
differentiated monopolistically competitive intermediate firms.14
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector with a
constant-returns-to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods.15 We denote the elasticity of substitution between any two different
sectoral goods by ω > 0. In each sector, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated
goods that are aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good. The elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties within a sector is denoted by ² > 0, and we assume that this is
higher than the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. ² > ω (see e.g., Jaimovich and
Floetotto [2008]). Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that
produces one variety is a price setter. Output Xi,j of firm i in sector j is produced using
capital and labor, i.e. Xi,j = H (Ki,j ,Li,j). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equaliz-
14This assumption relies upon observed empirical facts. The markups in the traded sector we estimated
for a sample of 13 OECD economies average to 1.2 with small dispersion across countries whereas for the
non-traded sector, the markups average to 1.4 with large dispersion across countries. Additionally, assuming
that the traded sector is imperfectly competitive would not affect qualitatively the results, as long as the
markup is fixed. Estimates of the markups charged by the traded sector are available on request while
estimates for the non-traded sector are reported in Table 3.
15This setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto’s [2008] model. Details of its derivation are therefore
relegated to the Appendix, which is available on request.
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ing markup-adjusted marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. HK/µ = rK ,
and HL/µ = W , where µ is the markup over the marginal costs. At a symmetric equi-
librium, non-traded output is equal to Y N = NX = H (KN , LN). We assume that there
are a large number of firms within each sector, so that each single intermediate producer
is small relative to the economy. In this set up each producer in a sector faces the same
price elasticity of demand, ². Hence, the producer of a variety charges a constant markup
µ = ee−1 , where e is the price-elasticity of demand. Because the number of competitors is
large, e is equal to ². In section 5, we relax this assumption and assume instead that a finite
number of firms operate within each sector producing non-tradable varieties.16 Whether
the markup is fixed or endogenous, we assume instantaneous entry, which implies that the
zero profit condition holds at each instant of time.
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , enables us to
express the production functions in intensive form, i.e. f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and
h
(
kN
) ≡ H (KN , LN) /LN . Production functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas
form: f
(
kT
)
=
(
kT
)θT
, and h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)θN
, where θT and θN represent the capital
income share in output in the traded and non-traded sectors respectively. Since inputs can
move freely between the two sectors, marginal products in the traded and the non-traded
sector equalize:
θT
(
kT
)θT−1
=
P
µ
θN
(
kN
)θN−1 ≡ rK , (6a)(
1− θT ) (kT )θT = P
µ
(
1− θN) (kN)θN ≡W. (6b)
These static efficiency conditions state that the sectoral marginal products must equal the
labor cost W and capital rental rate rK .
Aggregating labor and capital over the two sectors, gives us the resource constraints for
the two inputs:
LT + LN = L, KT +KN = K. (7)
2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government which finances government expenditure
by raising lump-sum taxes Z in accordance with the balanced condition:17
GT + PGN = Z. (8)
Public spending consists of purchases of traded goods, GT , and non-traded goods, GN . As
the data suggests that government expenditure tends to be mainly on non-traded goods,
16As stressed by Yang and Heijdra [1993], departing from the usual assumption made by Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977] implies that the price elasticity of demand becomes an increasing function of the number of firms and
that the markup is endogenous.
17Government spending on traded goods GT is considered for calibration purpose. The effects of a
permanent and temporary fiscal expansion on GT are explored in the Appendix, available on request.
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we concentrate on the effects of an increase in GN .18
2.4 Short-Run Static Solutions
System (6a)-(6b) can be solved for sector capital intensity ratios: kT = kT (P ) and kN =
kN (P ). Using the fact that W ≡ θT (kT )θT−1, the wage rate also depends on P , i.e.
W =W (P ), withWP ≷ 0. An increase in the relative price P raises or lowersW depending
on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.
Plugging sectoral capital-labor ratios into the resource constraints and production func-
tions leads to short-term static solutions for sectoral output: Y T = Y T (K,L, P ) and
Y N = Y N (K,L, P ). According to the Rybczynski effect, a rise in K raises the output of
the sector which is more capital intensive, while a rise in L raises the output of the sector
which is more labor intensive. An increase in the relative price of non tradables exerts op-
posite effects on sectoral outputs by shifting resources away from the traded sector towards
the non-traded output.
By substituting first W = W (P ), eqs. (5a)-(5b) can be solved for consumption and
labor supply as follows: C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
with Cλ¯ < 0, CP < 0, and L = L
(
λ¯, P
)
with Lλ¯ > 0
and LP ≷ 0. A rise in the shadow value of wealth induces agents to cut their real expenditure
and to supply more labor. By raising the consumption price index, an appreciation in the
relative price of non tradables drives down consumption. Finally, depending on whether
kT ≷ kN , a rise in P stimulates or depresses labor supply by raising or lowering W .
2.5 Macroeconomic Dynamics
The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic
system which comprises two equations. First, the dynamic equation for the relative price
of non-traded goods (5d) equalizes the return on domestic capital and traded bonds r?.
Second, the accumulation equation for physical capital clears the non-traded goods market
along the transitional path. This can be written as:
K˙ =
Y N (K,L, P )
µ
− CN (λ¯, P )−GN − δKK. (9)
Dynamic equations (5d) and (9) form a separate subsystem in P andK. Inserting short-run
static solutions, linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting the
long-term values with a tilde, we obtain in a matrix form: K˙
P˙
 =
 Y NKµ − δK Y NPµ − CNP
0 Y
T
K
P˜
 K(t)− K˜
P (t)− P˜
 (10)
18The data summarized in Table 3 reveal that the non-tradable content of government spending averages
about 90%.
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The determinant of the linearized 2× 2 matrix is unambiguously negative and the trace is
equal to r?.19 Hence, the equilibrium yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path,
irrespective of the relative sizes of the sectoral capital-labor ratios. Denoting the negative
eigenvalue by ν1 and the positive eigenvalue by ν2, the general solutions for K and P are
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (11)
where B1 and B2 are constants to be determined and ωi2 is the eigenvector associated with
the eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2). Two features of the two-sector economy’s equilibrium
dynamics deserve special attention. First, as long as the markup is fixed, if kT > kN , the
temporal path for the relative price remains flat for the no-arbitrage condition (5d) to be
fulfilled. Hence, in this case, ω12 = 0. If capital intensities are reversed, then ω
1
2 < 0. As a
consequence, the relative price exhibits transitional dynamics; P and K move in opposite
directions. Second, after a permanent fiscal shock, to ultimately approach the steady-state
(K˜, P˜ ) and to satisfy the transversality condition limt→∞ P (t)K(t)e−r
?t = 0, it is necessary
to set the arbitrary constant B2 equal to zero. When the expansionary policy is only
transitorily implemented (i.e. the fiscal shock only lasts for T periods), two periods have to
be considered, namely a first period (labelled period 1) over which the temporary policy is
in effect, and a second period (labelled period 2) after the policy has been removed. While
the small country converges towards its new long run equilibrium over period 2, i. e. B2
must be set to zero, the economy follows unstable paths over period 1. These are described
by eqs. (11).
Substituting eqs. (9) and (8) into eq. (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the
current account (denoted by CA ≡ B˙):
B˙ = r?B + Y T (K,L, P )− CT (λ¯, P )−GT , (12)
where Y T −CT −GT correspond to net exports. Eq. (12) states that the current account is
equal to the balance of trade denoted by NX plus interest receipts on outstanding assets.
Linearizing (12) around the steady-state and substituting (11), the general solution for the
stock of foreign assets is given by:20
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t. (13)
When the disturbance is temporary, we must take into account that assets (i.e. domestic
capital and foreign bonds) have been accumulated (or decumulated) over the period 1.
The time path for net foreign assets is described by eq. (13) during this unstable period.
19See the Appendix for further details.
20If kT > kN , then Φ1 = −P˜ < 0 and Φ2 = P˜ ν1
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk)
]}
. If kN > kT ,
then Φ1 = P˜ ν2
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
and Φ2 = −P˜ .
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As stocks of assets are modified over period 1 (i.e. (0, T )), we have to take new initial
conditions (i.e. BT and KT ) into account when the fiscal policy is removed.21
2.6 Steady-State
We will now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. Setting P˙ = 0 into eq. (5d), we
obtain the equality between the rate of return on domestic capital income and the exogenous
world interest rate, i.e.
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
µ
− δK = r?. (14)
This equality determines the steady-state value of the relative price of non-tradables, i.e.
P˜ . Hence, the long-run level of P remains unaffected by a rise in government spending, as
long as the markup is fixed.
Setting K˙ = 0 into eq. (9) yields the market-clearing condition for the non-traded good:
Y N
(
K˜, L˜, P˜ ,
)
µ
= CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ I˜ +GN , (15)
where I˜ = δKK˜.
Setting B˙ = 0 into eq. (12) leads to the market-clearing condition for the traded good:
Y T
(
K˜, L˜, P˜
)
= −r?B˜ + CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+GT . (16)
For the country to remain ultimately solvent, we have to impose one single and overall
intertemporal budget constraint:22
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (17)
where Φ1 < 0 describes the effect of capital accumulation on the the external asset position
and K0 and B0 are the initial conditions.23 The four equations (14)-(17) jointly determine
P˜ , K˜, B˜ and λ¯.
3 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: An Analytical Exploration
In this section, we explore analytically the macroeconomic effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion, emphasizing how traded and non-traded goods modify the propagation mech-
21Following a permanent budget policy, the economy moves along a stable path; hence, the trajectory for
B(t) is obtained by invoking the transversality condition limt→∞ λ¯B(t)e−r
?t = 0 which implies that B2 = 0.
22Substituting first the short-run solutions, then linearizing the dynamic equation of the internationally
traded bonds (12) in the neighborhood of the steady-state, substituting the solutions for K(t) and P (t) and
finally invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal
budget constraint (17).
23Since for all parameterizations, Φ1 is always negative, we assume Φ1 < 0 from now thereon. Hence,
capital accumulation deteriorates the current account along the transitional path.
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anism.24 Suppose that at time t = 0, the government raises public spending on the non-
traded good and at time T it removes the expansionary budget policy.25 The higher T ,
the stronger the persistence of the shock. For ease of computation, we first consider the
labor supply to be inelastically supplied; only in this case are we able to derive analytical
expressions for the impact effects of a temporary fiscal expansion, regardless of sectoral
capital intensities.26 At the end of this section, we discuss the implications of elastic labor
supply, when analytical expressions can be derived only if kT > kN .27
3.1 The Case of Inelastic labor Supply
We investigate both the impact and long-run effects of a temporary rise in GN by assuming
that the labor supply is fixed. In particular, we provide analytical expressions of impact
effects on key economic variables, namely investment and the current account.
Impact Effects
Let fist consider the situation when the traded sector is more capital intensive than
the non-traded sector. Since taxes must be raised to balance the budget, the subsequent
fall in the real disposable income induces agents to lower their consumption. Because the
reduction in real expenditure is spread over the two goods, the fall in consumption of the
non-traded good is not large enough to compensate for the rise in public spending GN .
Hence, an excess demand arises in the non-traded good market which produces a drop in
investment (see eq. (9)). Formally, the initial reaction of investment is given by
dI(0)
dGN
= αC
(
1− e−r?T
)
− 1 < 0, (18)
where αC is the non tradable content of consumption. The first term on the RHS of
(18) reflects the positive effect of the drop in CN on capital accumulation. As shown by
the second term on the RHS, the rise in GN withdraws resources from investment. Since
αC
(
1− e−r?T ) is smaller than one, a rise in GN unambiguously crowds-out investment on
impact. If public spending is raised over a short period (i.e. if T is small), agents reduce
their real expenditure by a small amount because the tax burden is low. Consequently,
the excess of demand in the non-traded good market increases, which drives down further
investment.
24As the shocks identified in the VAR literature are transitory, we focus the theoretical analysis on
temporary increases in government spending.
25We assume further that all agents perfectly understand at the outset the temporary nature of the policy
change. Hence, at time T , there is no new information and thereby no jump in the marginal utility of wealth
at this date.
26To derive formal solutions after a temporary fiscal shock, we applied the procedure developed by Schu-
bert and Turnovsky [2002].
27In deriving formal solutions after temporary fiscal shocks, without loss of generality, we assume that
the non-traded sector is perfectly competitive so that the markup is one, and that the rate of depreciation
of physical capital is zero. In the numerical analysis, we relax these two assumptions.
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The adjustment of the current account is described by the market-clearing condition
for the traded good, i.e. eq (12). Since consumption in the traded good falls, net exports
increase which yields a current account surplus as the stock of traded bonds is initially
predetermined. After tedious computations, it can be shown that the initial reaction of the
current account is given by:
dCA(0)
dGN
= P˜ (1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (19)
where 1−αC is the tradable content of consumption. The current account surplus increases
with the length of the shock T as consumption in the traded good CT falls by a larger
amount.
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded sector, sectoral outputs
remain unaffected as the relative price P is unchanged and the capital stock is predeter-
mined.
The responses of investment and the current account change dramatically when the
capital intensities are reversed. The reason is that now, the relative price of non tradables
appreciates on impact as a result of the excess of demand in the non-traded good market.
The increase in P influences sectoral outputs by shifting resources from the traded sector
towards the non-traded sector. Since Y N now expands, the response of investment becomes
ambiguous as resources are devoted to capital accumulation. More formally, the reaction
of investment is given by:
dI(0)
dGN
=
(
ν2 − ν1
ν2
)(
1− e−ν2T )+ σCC˜N
λ¯
ν1
ν2
dλ¯
dGN
− 1, (20)
where
dλ¯
dGN
=
αC λ¯
σCC˜N
(
1− Ψ˜
1− αCΨ˜
)(1− e−ν2T )− (e−r?T − e−ν2T )(
1− Ψ˜
)
 > 0,
with 0 < Ψ˜ ≡ − r?
ν22
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2 < 1. The first term on the RHS of eq. (20) reflects the positive
influence on investment of the initial appreciation in the relative price of non tradables.
This term is positive and increasing with T . As shown by the second term on the RHS, the
wealth effect reflected by a rise in the marginal utility of wealth λ¯, now exerts a negative
impact on capital accumulation. The reason is that the drop in real disposable income
induces agents to reduce CN which in turn moderates the excess of demand in the non-
traded good market and thereby the appreciation in P . The last term on the RHS of eq.
(20) reflects the rise in GN that withdraws resources from physical capital accumulation.
Hence, investment may now respond positively to a fiscal shock as a result of the initial rise
in P .
Whereas the relative price appreciation of non-traded goods exerts a positive impact on
investment by raising non-traded output, it drives down net exports by depressing traded
output on impact, due to the shift of resources towards the non-traded sector. Regardless of
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the length of the fiscal shock, we find that the current account unambiguously deteriorates
after an increase in GN :
dCA(0)
dGN
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
−ν1Φ1 (1− αC)
ν2
(
1− αCΨ˜
) [(1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0.
(21)
where Φ1 = −P˜
(
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
< 0.
When kN > kT , the initial rise in the relative price of non tradables causes a shifting
of labor away from the traded to the non-traded sector. Hence, Y N rises in the short-run
while Y T falls on impact.
Long-Run Effects
A temporary increase in government spending has permanent or long-run effects, be-
cause the model features the zero-root property.28 Since government spending reverts back
to its initial level at time T , in the long-run (i.e. in the steady-state) changes are only
driven by the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth. Confronted
with a fall in their disposable income, agents are induced to permanently lower their real
consumption. As consumption in the non-traded sector is reduced, non-traded output is
decreased as well in the long-run, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. Hence, labor
shifts from the non-traded to the traded sector, and traded output expands in the long-run.
The reason is that the small open economy decumulates traded bonds as a result of the
investment boom once the fiscal shock ends. To service the debt accumulated over the
transition, the economy must run a trade balance surplus in the long-run, which is achieved
through a drop in CT and a rise in Y T .
As labor is fixed, the long-run adjustment of GDP is driven by capital accumulation
which depends on sectoral capital intensities. Since Y N declines in the long-run to meet
lower demand, capital falls or rises depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or
less capital intensive, and so GDP decreases or increases.29
3.2 The Case of Elastic Labor Supply
We now clarify the role of labor supply in the transmission of fiscal policy.
Impact Effects
Let us first assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector. Following the drop in their disposable income, agents always cut their real expendi-
ture but also supply more labor. According to Rybczynski’s theorem, a rise in labor supply
raises the output of the sector which is more labor intensive.
The labor supply channel now makes the responses of investment and the current ac-
28Technically, this follows from the assumption that β = r?, which requires the joint determination of the
transition and the steady-state.
29Formal expressions are derived by setting σL = 0 into (24).
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count ambiguous by affecting sectoral outputs. More precisely, the rise in non-traded out-
put implies that higher public spending GN may crowd in or crowd out capital investment.
Formally, the initial reaction of investment should now be rewritten as:
dI(0)
dGN
= −
1 + (1− e−r?T )
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0. (22)
Setting σL = 0 in eq. (22) yields eq. (18). As long as σL > 0, the sign of eq. (22)
is no longer clear-cut. The more responsive the labor supply, the larger the increase in
employment on impact, and thereby the less likely it is that investment is crowded out by
public spending.
Turning to the initial response of the current account, we obtain after computation:
dCA(0)
dGN
= P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)1 +
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≷ 0. (23)
By depressing traded output, the increase in labor now makes a deterioration in the current
account possible. The higher the elasticity of labor supply σL, the more likely an initial
drop in the current account.
When kN > kT , the initial change in labor supply is the result of two opposite forces:
the wealth effect which induces agents to supply more labor and the appreciation in the
relative price of non tradable goods that counteracts this effect by driving down the wage
rate. Hence, employment may increase or decrease on impact. As will become clear in
Section 4, the elasticity σL plays a crucial role in driving the initial reaction of labor
supply, and thereby the change in GDP on impact. For clarity, let us assume that agents
supply more labor. Higher employment exerts a negative impact on non-traded output
and a positive influence on traded output.30 Hence, the increase in L makes a drop in
investment more likely as resources are shifted towards the traded sector. However, the
relative price of non-tradables exerts a positive impact on investment. Finally, the initial
current account reaction is no longer clear cut as net exports may fall or increase on impact.
More precisely, while a higher labor supply boosts traded output, the appreciation of the
real exchange rate exerts a negative impact on Y T . To sum up, if the relative price channel
predominates, investment is crowded in while the current account falls into deficit.
Long-Run Effects
The conclusions established in the case of an inelastic labor supply hold in the long run,
with the exception of the steady-state changes in physical capital and GDP. Regardless of
sectoral capital intensities, it is found that the open economy accumulates physical capital
as long as the labor supply is elastic enough. Using the fact that the steady-state capital
stock can be expressed as a function of the marginal utility of wealth and government
30We were unable to obtain analytical results for kN > kT . Yet, as shown numerically, the analytical
results for an inelastic labor supply hold.
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spending GN , and remembering than in the long-run, GN remains unchanged, the long-run
adjustment of physical capital is given by:31
dK˜
dGN
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
= − 1
λ¯ν1
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
) dλ¯
dGN
> 0, kT > kN , (24a)
dK˜
dGN
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
= − 1
λ¯ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
) dλ¯
dGN
≷ 0, kN > kT , (24b)
where Kλ¯ represents the partial derivative of the steady-state capital stock w.r.t. the
shadow value of wealth λ¯, ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 are the stable and unstable roots, and
dλ¯/dGN > 0 reflects the wealth effect. If kT > kN , capital stock and labor supply are
positively correlated in the long-run, and a temporary fiscal expansion crowds in investment
in the long run. With the reversal of capital intensities, K˜ and L˜ move together only
if σCC˜N − σLL˜k˜T ν2 < 0. More precisely, if the labor supply is elastic enough, higher
employment triggers a drop in non-traded output to such an extent that capital stock must
increase to clear the non-traded good market. As we shall see in the next section, K˜
increases in all scenarios, even if σL is small.
4 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: A Quantitative Exploration
In this section, we analyze the effects of a temporary rise in government spending quanti-
tatively. For this purpose we solve the model numerically. We therefore discuss parameter
values first, before turning to the long- and short-term effects of the fiscal shock
4.1 Baseline Parametrization
We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a
baseline. The world interest rate which is equal to the subjective time discount rate β is set
to 1%. One period of time corresponds to a quarter. The elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods φ is set to 1.5 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott [2003]). An
additional critical parameter is ϕ which is set to 0.5 in the baseline calibration to target a
non tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e., αC) of 45%, in line with our
empirical evidence.32 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption σC is set
to 0.5 because empirical evidence overwhelmingly suggest values smaller than one.33 One
critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply σL. In our
baseline parametrization, we set σL = 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and
Flode´n [2006].
We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We assume that physical
capital depreciates at a rate δK = 1.5% to target an investment-GDP ratio of 20%. The
31Solving (14)-(16) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ yields: P˜ = constant, K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN
)
and B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN
)
. See the
Appendix for further details.
32Table 3 shows the non tradable content of GDP components for thirteen OECD countries.
33Consumption expenditure is 55% of GDP for our baseline calibration.
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shares of sectoral capital income in output take two different values depending on whether
the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. In line with
our estimates, if kT > kN , θT and θN are set to 0.4 and 0.3, respectively.34 Alternatively,
when kN > kT , we choose θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4. Setting the elasticity of substitution
between sectoral goods ω to 1 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, ² to 4
yields a markup charged by the non-traded sector of 1.35, which is close to our estimates
(see Table 3).
We set GN and GT so as to yield a non-tradable share of government spending of 90%,
and government spending as a share of GDP of 20%.35 We consider three different scenarios
for the duration of the fiscal shock: a short-lived (T = 8), a medium-lived (T = 16), and a
long-lived (T = 32) fiscal shock. As the baseline scenario, we take the medium-lived fiscal
shock, i.e. a shock that lasts 16 quarters. In this case, the cumulative increase in government
spending corresponds approximately to the cumulative increase in US government spending
six years after an exogenous spending shock by one percentage point of GDP according to
the estimates reported by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]. For T = 16, we also conduct a sensitivity
analysis with respect to the elasticity of labor supply (i.e. we set σL to 0.1 and 1).
4.2 Long-Run Effects
Panel A of Table 1 gives the numerical results for the long-run effects of a temporary fiscal
expansion. In the baseline scenario, agents cut real expenditure by 0.07% of GDP while
they raise labor supply by 0.13% as a result of the decrease in real disposable income. The
open economy accumulates physical capital in the long-run, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities. This is because when kT > kN , the increase in employment produces an excess
of supply in the non-traded good market which calls for a long-run increase in capital that
yields a shift of labor towards the more capital intensive sector. This in turn raises traded
output and thereby net exports which allows the external debt accumulated in the short-
run to be serviced. If the capital intensities are reversed, the long-run rise in labor drives
down non-traded output. To clear the market, capital must be raised. Interestingly, while
GDP increases in all scenarios, the rise in GN always benefits the traded sector in the
long-run, irrespective of sectoral capital intensities. More precisely, remembering that the
relative price P remains unaffected by the fiscal shock in the long-run, traded output, i.e.
Y T = LT f
(
kT (P˜ )
)
, is only driven by employment LT . As the open economy must run a
34Table 3 gives the values of θj (j = T,N) for thirteen OECD countries. The values of θT and θN we
have chosen correspond roughly to the averages for countries with kT > kN . For these values, the non
tradable content of GDP and labor are 63% and 66%, respectively. When kN > kT , we can use reverse but
symmetric values for θN so that the size of kT − kN remains unchanged. For θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4, the
non tradable content of GDP and labor are 69% and 65%, respectively.
35Close to the average of the values reported in Table 3, the ratios GT /Y T and GN/Y N are 6% and 28%
in the baseline calibration.
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trade balance surplus in the long-run, traded output and thereby labor in that sector must
increase. With regard to non-traded output, Y N decreases in all scenarios if kN > kT since
the open country experiences sizeable current account deficits in the short-run that require
significant long-run improvement in the balance of trade.
4.3 Short-Run Effects
We now turn to the short-run effects of the fiscal expansion. We take the medium-lived
spending shock as our baseline scenario, but we also refer to short-lived and long-lived fiscal
shocks, as the length of fiscal stimulus may vary across countries. Panels B and C of Table
1 show the results for this situation, as well as for a number of alternative scenarios. While
panel B gives the response on impact, panel C displays the cumulative responses over the
first two years (i.e. eight quarters) after the shock.
The transitional paths of key variables under the baseline scenario are displayed in Fig-
ures 1. The responses of GDP, investment and current account are expressed in percentage
of the initial steady-state output, while the real exchange rate is given as the percentage
deviation from the initial steady state. Horizontal axes measure quarters. When the reac-
tion of the variable is sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply, we compare the baseline
scenario (solid line) to alternative scenarios. The dashed-dotted line gives the results for
a low labor supply elasticity (i.e. σL = 0.1), while the dotted line shows those for a high
labor supply elasticity (i.e. σL = 1).
Before analyzing in the detail the role of sectoral reallocation in shaping the short-run
dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government spending, we should mention
the set of empirical evidence established by Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]. It is found that in all
the countries in their sample, an exogenous increase in government spending raises output,
and induces a simultaneous decline of investment and the current account. In the following,
we discuss the predictions of our model for the behavior of these variables when kT > kN
and when kN > kT .
While employment and thereby GDP increase in all the scenarios where kT > kN , labor
supply and output increase slightly or decrease when the capital intensities are reversed.
The reason is that when kT > kN , agents are induced to supply more labor as a result of
the wealth effect. By contrast, when kN > kT , the appreciation of the real exchange rate
drives down the wage rate which in turn counteracts the wealth effect. Interestingly, we
find that employment and thereby GDP falls on impact if σL is raised from 0.5 to 1. The
reason is that for a given change in the shadow value of wealth, the relative price must
appreciate more as a result of the larger labor outflow. Hence, the consecutive decrease in
W is large enough to induce agents to supply less labor, which reduces GDP by 0.05% on
impact.
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In the model, the initial reaction of investment is ambiguous as long as labor supply is
elastic. Numerically, we find that its short-run response depends heavily on sectoral capital
intensities. On impact, an increase in GN crowds out investment only if the traded sector
is more capital intensive. While non-traded output expands as a result of the increase in
labor supply, the rise in public spending GN produces an excess of demand which must be
eliminated by a drop in investment. As shown in the seventh line of panel B of Table 1, the
less elastic labor supply is, the larger the crowding-out effect of investment. By contrast, if
the non-traded sector is more capital intensive, the increase in GN triggers an appreciation
in the relative price of non tradables P which stimulates Y N and thereby investment, in all
scenarios. The cumulative responses reported in the third line of panel C of Table 1 show
that a fiscal expansion crowds in investment by about 3.22% of initial GDP on impact if
kN > kT , while investment is crowded out by 3.16% if kT > kN . The investment boom
when kN > kT triggers a positive cumulative response of output, as summarized in the fifth
line of panel C in Table 1. By contrast, the decline in investment when kT > kN implies a
smaller cumulative response of GDP, across all scenarios.36
As shown in the eight line of panel B of Table 1, the open economy experiences a current
account deficit, regardless of sectoral capital intensities. When kT > kN , a larger labor
supply induces a shift of labor towards the non-traded sector, and the subsequent decrease
in traded output drives down net exports. When the capital intensities are reversed, the
appreciation in the real exchange rate more than offsets the positive effect of the labor
inflow on Y T . As a consequence, traded output falls which yields a current account deficit.
4.4 Transitional Adjustment
We now discuss the dynamic effects which are depicted in Figures 1, starting with the
adjustment of labor which is displayed in the third line. The dashed-dotted line shows the
results for a weakly responsive labor supply (i.e. σL = 0.1), while the dotted line shows the
results for a highly elastic labor supply (i.e. σL = 1). If the traded sector is more capital
intensive, the temporal path for L is flat as the relative price P remains unaffected. When
kN > kT , the dynamics for L no longer degenerate as a result of the depreciation in the real
exchange rate (after its initial appreciation) along the transitional path. The consequent
increase in the wage rate W induces agents to supply more labor during the transitional
period.
The transitional path of investment is also quite distinct, depending on whether the
traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector. Along the transi-
36As shown in the fifth line of panel C in Table 1, the cumulative response of GDP at a two-year horizon
is negative in two scenarios when kT > kN : when σL is low and when the fiscal shock is short-lived. In
these two scenarios, the response of labor supply is limited, Y N rises less, and the excess demand in the
non-traded good market becomes larger, which in turn produces a larger decline in investment.
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tional path, capital accumulation clears the non-traded good market. When kT > kN , the
size of the crowding-out of investment reduces over time, but when kT > kN , investment de-
creases monotonically as the depreciation in the relative price P lowers non-traded output.
After about 2 years, the investment flow becomes negative and the open economy decumu-
lates physical capital until the fiscal policy is removed. At time T , government spending GN
reverts back to its initial level which releases resources for capital accumulation. Regardless
of sectoral capital intensities, investment is crowded in.
The temporal path for GDP is driven by the adjustments in both labor and capital. In
the case kT > kN , the dynamics for GDP are the mirror image of capital accumulation: the
slowdown in GDP growth as government spending is raised originates from the crowding
out of investment. By contrast, when kN > kT , the temporal path of output is hump-
shaped: GDP growth first increases as labor supply rises, and then slows down as a result
of the decline in investment which starts after about two years. At the time the fiscal
policy is removed, the economy experiences an investment boom which boosts GDP in
both cases. While in a one-sector model, the response of output increases with labor
supply responsiveness (as stressed by Baxter and King [1993]), this is not the case when
we consider a two-sector model. Considering that kT > kN and raising σL from 0.5 to 1
increases the cumulative GDP response from 0.32 to 0.55. By contrast, when kN > kT , the
reaction of GDP decreases from 0.69 to 0.58, as a result of the drop in the wage rate which
depresses labor supply.
Regardless of sectoral capital intensities, the current account stays in deficit while gov-
ernment spending is raised. In the case kT > kN , the decumulation of physical capital
drives down traded output, which in turn amplifies the current account deficit along the
transitional path. If the sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the depreciation in the
relative price of non tradables moderates the decrease in Y T and thereby the worsening in
the foreign asset position. Yet, in the latter case, the current account deficit at an horizon
of two years is almost three times larger, as shown in the fourth line of panel C of Table 1.
4.5 Sectoral Decomposition of the Effects of Fiscal Shocks
The sectoral decomposition of the effects of fiscal shocks sheds light on the propagation
mechanism in an open economy. The impact and cumulative responses of sectoral outputs
are summarized in the last two lines of panels B and C of Table 1, respectively. Interestingly,
the sectoral outputs change in opposite directions, both on impact and along the transitional
path. In the benchmark scenario, assuming that kT > kN , agents raises the labor supply by
0.12% which induces a shift of employment towards the more labor intensive sector. As a
result, non-traded output increases by 0.32% of GDP while traded output declines by 0.24%
of GDP. If sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the appreciation in the relative price of
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non-tradables is large enough to more than offset the Rybczynski effect which boosts non-
traded output by 1% of initial GDP while the traded sector experiences a decline by the same
amount. Hence, GDP remains unchanged on impact in the case kN > kT . Interestingly,
raising σL amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses as agents supply less labor.
The fifth line of Figure 1 depicts the transitional paths of sectoral outputs expressed as
percentage deviations from the initial steady-state values scaled by the initial GDP. The
solid line depicts the transitional path for traded output while the dotted line shows the
dynamics for Y N . Along the transitional path, sectoral outputs vary in opposite directions
as a result of the reallocation of inputs across sectors. When kT > kN , capital decumulation
produces a fall in traded output while non-traded output expands. Whereas sectoral outputs
diverge in this configuration, Y T and Y N converge when kN > kT . More precisely, the
relative price depreciation raises traded output whereas the fall in P drives down non-
traded output. Finally, as shown in the two last lines of panel A of Table 1, long-run GDP
growth is driven by traded output growth. The rise in traded output is required in the
long-run to produce an improvement in the balance of trade, regardless of sectoral capital
intensities.
4.6 Taking the Model to the Data
Since time-series evidence on the effects of fiscal shocks, in particular on key variables like
investment, current account, and GDP, is now available, we decided to compare our model’s
predictions withe the empirical results.
Three notable papers have estimated the effects of fiscal shocks on the trade balance:
Beetsma, Giuludori and Klassen [2008], Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010], Monacelli and Perotti
[2010]. While the first paper includes only GDP and trade variables in its VAR model, the
other two also include components of GDP such as investment. All these papers use the
Blanchard-Perotti identification scheme that assumes that government spending is prede-
termined within the quarter relative to the other variables included in the VAR model. Yet,
they differ in their sample of countries: Beetsma et al. [2008] consider fourteen European
Union countries and use a panel vector auto-regression approach; Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010]
and Monacelli and Perotti [2010] estimate the effects of fiscal shocks for four countries:
Canada, Australia, the UK and the US. All three papers find that an exogenous increase
in government spending raises output and lowers the current account. Additionally, Cardi
and Mu¨ller and Monacelli and Perotti report a substantial decline in investment following
a fiscal expansion. The ability of our model to predict such empirical facts is mixed, as it
relies upon sectoral capital intensities.
A rise in government spending crowds out investment only if the traded sector is more
capital intensive than the non-traded sector. The reason is that when kN > kT , the relative
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price of non-tradables appreciates on impact, which produces a reallocation of resources
towards the non-traded sector so that investment is crowded in on impact, irrespective
of the shock’s duration or the elasticity of labor supply. It is worthwhile noting that a
one-sector small open economy model (see e.g., Karayalc¸in [1999]) cannot produce a drop
in investment after a fiscal shock because the increased labor supply raises the marginal
product of capital which leads to more investment.
We find that the current account deteriorates in all our model scenarios, in line with
empirical evidence. In the model, the short-run worsening in the foreign asset position
originates from the drop in the traded output caused by the labor shift towards the non-
traded sector. When kT > kN , the fall in Y T is triggered by the Rybczynski effect. If
sectoral capital intensities are reversed, the real exchange rate appreciation produces the
decline in Y T .
Empirical studies generally find that a fiscal expansion tends to raise output. Our model
produces a significant increase in GDP on impact in the benchmark scenario if kT > kN
since the real wage does not decrease in this case. If kN > kT , output is almost unaffected.
Yet, in this case, the cumulative response of GDP at an horizon of two years becomes
substantial across all scenarios, as shown in the fifth line of panel C of Table 1.
It is interesting to compare our results when kT > kN (panel C of Table 2) with
the numbers documented in empirical studies. By estimating a VAR model on quarterly
time-series data for the U.S., Australia, the U.K, and Canada, covering the period 1980-
2007, Cardi and Mu¨ller [2010] find that cumulative impulse responses after two years range
between 0.3 and 1.1 for output, between -0.1 and -1.1 for investment, and -0.1 and -1.8 for
the current account. While our model overpredicts both the crowding out of investment
and the current account deficit, it predicts pretty well the GDP response, falling in the
range of VAR evidence.
Finally, since our model predicts the sectoral impact of fiscal shocks, it is interesting
to compare our results with empirical data in this area. Only a few previous studies have
estimated the effects of a boost to government spending on sectoral outputs. Among these,
Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010] find that fiscal spending shocks generate a shift in the sectoral
composition of output as public purchases disproportionately benefit the non-traded sector.
This finding is in line with our numerical results reported in the two last lines of panel B
of Table 1. Regardless of sectoral capital intensities and across all the scenarios, a rise in
government spending boosts non-traded output, more so if the non-traded sector is more
capital intensive.
————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 1 about here >
————————————————————-
21
————————————————————-
< Please insert Figure 1 about here >
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5 Temporary Fiscal Expansion: The Case of Endogenous
Markup
Several papers have stressed that the variation in the number of competitors and the con-
secutive change in the markup provides an important magnification mechanism, see e.g.,
Jaimovich and, Floetotto [2008], Wu and Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007], all of whom consider
one-sector models. We therefore decide to revisit quantitatively the effects of temporary
fiscal shocks by allowing for the markup to be endogenous. Since the long-run effects remain
almost unchanged compared to those the case of fixed markup, we will not discuss them
further. Rather, we will concentrate on how an endogenous markup modifies the short-run
adjustment of key variables and influences the sectoral composition of GDP.
Before analyzing in detail the role of sectoral reallocation in shaping the short-run
dynamics in response to a temporary increase in government spending, we recall the con-
clusions of empirical studies. Perotti [2007] finds that the real wage responds positively to
a fiscal shock. Estimates by Monacelli and Perotti [2010] show that the real exchange rate
depreciates in the U.S., Australia, the U.K. and Canada, while Enders et al. [2011] confirm
this finding for the U.S. As shown in section 4, a two-sector model can produce the positive
impact on output and the simultaneous drop in investment and the current account after
a fiscal shock as long as the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-traded
sector. However, it fails to produce the real exchange rate depreciation or the rise in the
real wage. Since markup variations affect the relative price P and the wage rate W , we
decide to investigate whether the predictive power of the two-sector model would improve
if the markup were endogenous.
5.1 Extending the Model to Endogenous Markup
So far, we adopted the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption according to which the number of com-
petitors is large enough within each sector to yield a fixed price-elasticity of demand. Yet,
as emphasized by Yang and Heijdra [1993], the Dixit and Stiglitz’s [1977] assumption is an
approximation when the sectoral good is aggregated from a finite number of intermediate
goods. Following Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], we depart from the usual practice by
assuming that the number of firms is large enough that the strategic effects can be ignored,
but not so large that the effect of entry on the firm’s demand curve is minuscule. Con-
sequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm is no longer constant and
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equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but rather a function of
the number of firms N . Taking into account that output of one variety does not affect the
general price index P , but does influence the sectoral price level, in a symmetric equilibrium
the resulting price elasticity of demand is given by:37
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (25)
Assuming that ² > ω, the price elasticity of demand faced by any single firm is an increasing
function of the number of firms N within a sector. Henceforth, the markup µ = ee−1
decreases as the number of competitors increases.
In the interest of space, we restrict our attention to the major changes in deriving
the macroeconomic equilibrium. First, the zero-profit condition in the intermediate good
sector can be solved for the number of firms, i.e. N = N (K,L, P ). Bearing in mind that
µ = µ (N), the equalities of marginal products between sectors (i.e., eqs. (6)) imply that
capital-labor ratios kj (j = T,N) are affected by the markup and so by the number of
firms, i.e. kj = kj (P, µ). Substituting the capital-labor ratios into θT
(
kT
)θT−1 ≡ W to
solve for the wage rate, and into the resource constraints (i.e., eqs. (7)) and the production
functions to solve for the sectoral outputs, short-run static solutions become:
W =W (P, µ) , Y T = Y T (K,P,L, µ) , Y N = Y N (K,P,L, µ) , (26)
where Wµ ≶ 0 depending on whether kT ≷ kN , Y Tµ > 0 and Y Nµ < 0. To understand this
result intuitively, i.e. the impact of markup variations, let us consider that the number of
competitors increases so that µ falls. All things being equal, since the ratio P/µ rises, non-
traded output Y N increases while traded output Y T falls. Additionally, if kT > kN , a fall in
the markup µ raises the capital-labor ratios and thereby the wage rate. As a consequence,
Y N rises further and Y T declines more because the increased real wage induces households
to raise labor supply which shifts towards the more labor intensive sector. The same logic
applies in the case kN > kT but W falls.
5.2 Short-Run Effects
We now investigate the short-term effects of fiscal shocks when the markup is endogenous,
focusing on the shift in the real exchange rate and the adjustment of the real wage. The
latter has been estimated as the ratio of the wage rate to the consumption price index.
Numerical results for impact and cumulative effects are summarized in panels B and C of
Table 2.38 The baseline calibration is identical to that described in section 4.1.
Case kT > kN
We first consider the situation when the traded sector is more capital intensive. As
the number of firms, and thereby the markup, adjusts over time, the dynamics for the real
37Details of the derivation can be found in the Appendix.
38To aid comprehension, panel B of Table 2 also shows the initial reaction of the wage rate W .
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exchange rate are restored and driven by the no-arbitrage equation according to which the
return on domestic capital must be equalized with the return on traded bonds:
hk
{
kN [P, µ (N)]
}
µ (N)
+
P˙
P
− δK = r?. (27)
The markup µ depends on the number of firms N which drives profits down towards zero
in the non-traded sector at each instant of time. Since non-traded output is expected to
increase while government spending GN is raised, it creates profit opportunities in that
sector. Hence, the number of firms increases over time, which lowers the markup. The
subsequent decrease in the return of capital hk/µ triggered by the rise in kN requires a fall
in the relative price of non-traded goods. As shown in the second line of panel B of Table 2,
P drops on impact across all scenarios, as long as kT > kN . While the initial depreciation
in P is fairly small, the first line of panel C reveals that the real exchange rate depreciation
becomes substantial at an horizon of two years.
The reaction of the wage rate is the result of two opposite forces: the fall in the markup
which raises W and the decline in P that lowers it. As shown in the third line of panel B of
Table 2, the wage rate decreases on impact as the relative price channel predominates. The
second line of panel C shows that the two-year horizon cumulative response of the real wage
is negative for the baseline scenario. Yet, as displayed in Figure 1, the dynamic path for
the real wage shows that it increases along the transitional path and exceeds its initial level
after about 6 quarters. Only if the fiscal shock is short-lived or long-lived (i.e., GN is raised
over 8 or 32 quarters), does the cumulative response of the real wage becomes positive.
After a long-lived fiscal shock, both non-traded output expansion and, as a consequence,
firm entry are larger. Hence, the decline in the markup is large enough to produce a positive
cumulative response of the real wage. Following a short-lived fiscal shock, the real exchange
rate appreciates rapidly after its short-term depreciation, and it has a positive impact on
the wage rate.
Let now investigate how the markup variations modify the responses of key economic
variables, relative to those obtained with a fixed markup. First, as a result of the initial
drop in the wage rate, labor supply increases more moderately. Second, the real exchange
rate depreciation induces a shift of resources towards the traded sector. As shown in the
two last lines of panel B of Table 2, while non-traded output increases very slightly on
impact in the baseline scenario, Y N decreases substantially if the fiscal shock is short-lived
(i.e., T = 8) or the labor supply is weakly responsive (i.e., σL = 0.1), because the wealth
effect is smaller or the labor supply reacts less to the wealth effect. As a consequence,
investment is crowded out by a larger amount (almost 1% of initial GDP rather than 0.66%
when the markup is fixed). Third, as the relative price P depreciates, traded output now
expands (instead of declining) in all scenarios, except that of a long-lived fiscal shock. While
the initial increase in Y T triggers a small current account surplus on impact, panel C of
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Table 2 reveals that the external asset position worsens very rapidly and dramatically in
the short-run. Fourth, as labor the supply increases less, the cumulative response of GDP
summarized in panel C remains smaller than when the markup is fixed.
To summarize, the two-sector model can produce a real exchange rate depreciation but
fails to trigger a positive cumulative response of the wage rate for the baseline duration of
the fiscal shock, i.e. T = 16.
Case kN > kT
While the two-sector model does a fairly good job of accommodating most of the evi-
dence reported by empirical studies if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the
non-traded sector, the predictive power of the two-sector model is weak if sectoral capital
intensities are reversed.
When kN > kT , non-traded output is expected to increase sizeably after a temporary
increase in GN . The consequent flow of entries triggers a substantial decline in the markup.
The drop in µ now raises the return on domestic capital, which requires a real exchange
rate appreciation. This prediction contradicts the empirical evidence. The real exchange
rate appreciation, together with the decline in the markup, drive down the wage rate. As
the cost of consumption goods increases, the real wage falls substantially. The last line of
Figure 1 reveals that the real wage fails to exceed its original value along the transitional
path.
The GDP response to a fiscal shock when kN > kT is negative in most of scenarios, due
the substantial decline in the real wage which exerts a negative impact on labor supply.
More precisely, L increases only if σL is low or the fiscal shock is long-lived. Furthermore,
the competition channel amplifies the increase in investment. The reason is that, as inter-
mediate good producers in the non-traded sector perceive a more elastic demand, they are
induced to produce more. Since Y N increases by a larger amount than in the case of a fixed
markup, investment is further crowded in.
Whereas non-traded output expands substantially, traded output falls dramatically
across all scenarios as a result of the appreciation in the real exchange rate and the smaller
markup. The subsequent decline in net exports drives the current account into a larger
deficit than with a fixed markup.
————————————————————-
< Please insert Table 2 about here >
————————————————————-
5.3 Sectoral Effects
We now turn to the sectoral impact of fiscal policy. This will allow us to investigate whether
the competition channel amplifies or reduces the heterogeneity in sectoral output responses.
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When kT > kN , the competition channel modifies the distribution of the increase in
GDP across sectors substantially, as summarized in the two last lines of panel B of Table
2. With a fixed markup, traded output falls in all scenarios, while the fiscal shock boosts
non-traded output. But if µ is endogenous, the real exchange rate depreciation is strong
enough to boost traded output on impact, as long as the fiscal shock does not last too long.
The reason is that when the fiscal shock is long-lived, the wealth effect is substantial and
thereby counteracts the negative impact on L of the decline in W . As a consequence, the
labor supply increases substantially and shifts towards the non-traded sector.
With regard to the transitional dynamics, as shown in the sixth line of Figure 1, while
the real exchange rate continues to depreciate, the crowding-out of investment together with
the rise in labor supply boost Y N but depress Y T . In a nutshell, due to the intersectoral
reallocation of resources, the transitional adjustment of Y T is the mirror image of the
dynamics of Y N . The results displayed in the two last lines of panel C of Table 2 show that
with an endogenous markup, the cumulative responses of traded and non-traded output are
-3.84% and 4.05% of initial GDP respectively, while the cumulative responses are -4.11%
and 4.42%, respectively, with a fixed markup. Hence, when kT > kN , the decline in µ
reduces the heterogeneity in the responses of sectoral outputs. Nevertheless, the fall in
traded output remains substantial after two years. Once the fiscal shock ends, non-traded
output starts decreasing (as investment is crowded in), while traded output rises. In the
long-run, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output.
If kN > kT , the patterns of the transitional adjustment of sectoral output remain
approximately the same as those found with a fixed markup. Yet, the competition channel
amplifies the dispersion of sectoral output responses. More precisely, non-traded output
rises by more than 2% of initial GDP (rather than about 1% when the markup is fixed).
In conclusion, regardless of sectoral capital intensities and whether the markup is fixed
or not, non-traded output always expands significantly following a temporary increase in
public spending. Allowing for the markup to depend on the number of competitors, the nu-
merical analysis reveals that the competition channel moderates or amplifies the responses
of sectoral outputs, depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive
than the non-traded sector.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the open economy version of the two-sector neoclassical
model with traded and non-traded goods can account for the empirical evidence on the
effects of fiscal shocks, but only if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non-
traded sector. In particular, a robust conclusion emerging from empirical papers is that
government spending tends to crowd out both investment and the current account. Con-
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sidering both traded and non-traded goods enables the model to account for this finding,
whereas the standard one-sector small open-economy framework cannot. In addition, by
enabling the markup to depend negatively on the number of competitors, the model can
generate a counter-cyclical markup which is pivotal to producing the real exchange rate de-
preciation which has recently been documented in the empirical literature. The subsequent
decline in the consumption price index and the positive impact of the lower markup on the
wage rate produces an increase in the real wage, although only if the fiscal shock is short-
or long-lived, not if it holds for a medium term.
In addition to the ability of the two-sector economy model to provide a better under-
standing of the fiscal transmission mechanism in an open economy, it delivers interesting
insights into the sectoral effects of fiscal shocks. The numerical analysis reveals that the
relative size of the non-traded sector increases substantially in the short-run, in line with
the evidence reported by Be´ne´trix and Lane [2010]. Our numerical results also show that in
the long-run, the relative size of the traded sector increases to service the debt accumulated
in the short-run. Hence, GDP growth is mostly driven by the rise in traded output in
the long-run. Along the transitional path, in all scenarios, the outputs of the two sectors
move in opposite direction. More precisely, traded output can either fall or rise during the
transition period when government spending is raised, depending on whether the traded
sector is more or less capital intensive than the non-traded sector.
The duration of the fiscal shock plays also a pivotal role in driving the responses of both
aggregate and sectoral variables. In all the scenarios, both labor supply and GDP increase
more when the fiscal expansion is implemented over a long rather than a short period. The
multiplier can exceed one only in this case, while the dispersion of responses of sectoral
outputs is amplified.
In conclusion, we must stress a number of caveats. If the non-traded sector is assumed to
be the more capital intensive sector, the model fails to match the evidence along a number of
dimensions. Notably, in this case, the two-sector model fails to account for the crowding-out
of investment which is one of the most consistent responses to a fiscal shock documented in
the empirical literature. Additionally, if the traded sector is more capital intensive than the
non-traded sector, the model cannot produce a positive cumulative response of the real wage
in the baseline scenario. Finally, due to our assumption of perfect mobility across sectors,
traded and non-traded output vary in opposite direction while evidence by Be´ne´trix and
Lane [2010] mostly predict that sectoral outputs co-vary. Further analysis of these issues
has to be left for future research.
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Figure 1: Effect of government spending shocks. Notes: variables are measured in percent-
age points of output, with the exception of employment, the real exchange rate and real
wage which are scaled by their initial steady-state values.
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A Data
In this Appendix, we describe how we split output, labor and GDP components into a
traded sector and a non-traded sector. Table 3 shows the non-tradable content of GDP,
employment, consumption, gross fixed capital formation and government spending. Table
3 also shows the share of government spending on the traded and non-traded good in the
sectoral output, the shares of capital income in output in both sectors, and the markup
charged by the non-traded sector for 13 OECD countries. The choice of these countries has
been dictated by data availability. For the countries of our sample, the period runs from
1970 to 2004.39
For output and employment, we used the methodology proposed by De Gregorio et al.
[1994], who treat Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Total
Manufacturing, Transport and Storage and Communication as traded goods. Electricity,
Gas and Water Supply, Construction, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants,
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services, Community Social and Personal
Services are classified as non-traded sectors (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]). The non-tradable
shares of output and labor, shown in the first and second column of Table 3, average to
65% and 63%, respectively.
To split consumption expenditure into consumption in traded and non-traded goods,
we made use of the Classification of Individual Consumption by Purpose (COICOP) pub-
lished by the United Nations (Source: United Nations [2007]). Among the twelve items, the
following ones are treated as consumption in traded goods: Food and Non-Alcoholic Bev-
erages, Alcoholic Beverages, Tobacco and Narcotics, Clothing and Footwear, Furnishings,
Household Equipment, Transport, Miscellaneous Goods and Services. The remaining items
are treated as consumption in non-traded goods: Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Fu-
els, Health, Communication, Recreation and Culture, Education, Restaurants and Hotels.
The non-tradable share of consumption shown in the third column of Table 3 averages to
45%, in line with the share reported by Stockman and Tesar [1995].
With regard to investment, we follow the methodology proposed by Burstein et al. [2004]
who treat Housing and Other Construction as non-tradable investment and Products of
agriculture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, Metal products and machinery, Transport
Equipment as tradable investment expenditure (Source: OECD Input-Output database
[2008a]). Non tradable share of investment shown in the fourth column of Table 3 averages
to 60%, in line with estimates provided by Burstein et al. [2004].
Sectoral government expenditure data were obtained from the Government Finance
Statistics Yearbook (Source: IMF [2007]) and the OECD General Government Accounts
database (Source: OECD [2008b]). Adopting Morshed and Turnovsky’s [2004] method-
ology, the following four sectors were treated as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agriculture,
39The exception is consumption expenditure. Data start in 1976 for Austria, in 1995 for Belgium, in 1975
for Finland, in 1991 for Germany, in 1987 for Netherlands, in 1995 for Spain and in 1993 for Sweden. Data
end in 2004 for all countries except Japan (1999) and the U.S. (2000).
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Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction; Transport and
Communications. The sectors treated as non-traded are: Government Public Services; De-
fense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and Welfare; Housing
and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs. The non tradable
component of government spending shown in the fifth column of Table 3 averages to 90%.
The proportion of government spending on the traded and non-traded good (i.e., GT /Y T
and GN/Y N ) are shown in the sixth and seventh column of Table 3. They average to 7%
and 32%, respectively.
Markups in the non-traded sector were estimated at the industry level in each country
and aggregated as follows to construct the markup: µ =
∑6
j=1 ωj µj where ωj is the nominal
value-added weight of industry j in the non-traded sector. Estimates of µj were obtained
by applying the methodology developed by Roeger [1995]. The testable equation is:
yj,t = βj xj,t + εj,t, (28)
where the dependent variable yj,t is the Solow residual - percentage change in output less
the percentage change in inputs (each input is weighted by the corresponding income share
in output) - and xj,t is the output growth minus capital growth.40 Estimate of µj is equal
to 1/(1 − βˆj). Variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the following: gross
output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at current
purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. All these variables are compiled
from the EU KLEMS database (Source: EU KLEMS [2007]), with the exception of the
user cost of capital rt. No sector-specific information was available to construct rt; hence,
the capital user cost is calculated as rt(≡ rj,t) = pI (i− piGDP + δK), with pI the deflator
for business non residential investment, i the long-term nominal interest rate, piGDP the
GDP deflator based inflation rate; the rate of depreciation δK is set to 5%; pI , i and
piGDP were taken from the OECD Annual National Accounts database (Source OECD
[2008c]). To tackle the potential endogeneity of the regressor and the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation of the error term when estimating (28), we use the correction of Newey
and West [1993].41 According to the estimates given in the last column of Table 3, the
markup charged by the non-traded sector averages to 1.39.
40Formally, yt = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − αL,t∆(wj,tLj,t) − αM,t∆(mj,tMj,t) − (1− αL,t − αM,t)∆ (rtKj,t) and
xj,t = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − ∆(rtKj,t). We denote by αi,t for i = L,M,K the share of a generic input (labor,
material and capital) on total output, ∆ (pj,tYj,t) the nominal output growth in industry j, ∆ (wj,tLj,t) the
nominal labor cost growth, ∆ (mj,tMj,t) the growth in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆ (rtKj,t) the
nominal capital cost growth.
41Countries estimates for each µˆj are not reported here to save space, but are available on request.
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A Short-Run Static Solutions
In this section, we compute short-run static solutions. It is worthwhile noting that in
this paper, we assume that the non traded sector is imperfectly competitive and charges a
markup denoted by µ. We also allow for the markup to be endogenous in section 5 in the
text. In order to isolate the influence of markup variations on variables, i.e. the competition
channel, we express variables in terms of the markup; hence, we treat µ as an exogenous
variable in computing short-run static solutions. For example, if a short-run static solution
is given by x = x
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
with λ¯ the shadow value of wealth, P the relative price of non
tradables and µ the markup, the variable x is only affected by λ¯ and P in the case of fixed
markup while x is influenced also by the competition channel when we allow for the markup
to be endogenous. In section K, we set out the model with an imperfectly competitive non-
traded sector, assuming that a limited number of competitors operate within each sector.
When the number of competitors is large, the imperfectly competitive non-traded sector
charges a fixed markup.
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
In this subsection, we compute short-run static solutions for real consumption and labor
supply. Static efficiency conditions (5a) and (5b) can be solved for consumption and labor
which of course must hold at any point of time:
C = C
(
λ¯, P
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, P, µ
)
, (29)
with
Cλ¯ =
∂C
∂λ¯
= −σCC
λ¯
< 0, (30a)
CP =
∂C
∂P
= −αCσCC
P
< 0, (30b)
Lλ¯ =
∂L
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
> 0, (30c)
LP =
∂L
∂P
= σLL
WP
W
= −σLL 1
W
kTh
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (30d)
Lµ =
∂L
∂µ
= σLL
Wµ
W
= σLL
1
W
kTPh
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (30e)
where σC and σL correspond to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption
and labor, respectively.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the
non tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (29) into intra-temporal
allocations between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for CT and CN :
CT = CT
(
λ¯, P
)
, CN = CN
(
λ¯, P
)
, (31)
with
CTλ¯ = −σC
CT
λ¯
< 0, (32a)
CTP = αC
CT
P
(φ− σC) ≶ 0, (32b)
CNλ¯ = −σC
CN
λ¯
< 0, (32c)
CNP = −
CN
P
[(1− αC)φ+ αCσC ] < 0, (32d)
where we used the fact that −P ′′Cp
P ′C
= φ (1− αC) > 0 and P ′CC = CN .
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Capital-Labor Ratios
From static optimality conditions (6a) and (6b), we may express sector capital-labor
ratios as functions of the real exchange rate:
kT = kT (P, µ) , kN = kN (P, µ) , (33)
with
kTP =
∂kT
∂P
=
h
µfkk (kN − kT ) , (34a)
kTµ =
∂kT
∂µ
= − Ph
(µ)2 fkk (kN − kT )
, (34b)
kNP =
∂kN
∂P
=
µf
P 2hkk (kN − kT ) . (34c)
kNµ =
∂kN
∂µ
= − f
Phkk (kN − kT ) . (34d)
Wage
Equality
[
f
(
kT
)− kT fk (kT )] ≡W can be solved for the wage rate:
W =W (P, µ) , (35)
with
WP =
∂W
∂P
= −kT fkkkTP = −kT
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (36a)
Wµ = −∂W
∂µ
= −kT fkkkTµ = kT
Ph
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0. (36b)
Labor
Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (29) and capital-labor ratios (33) into
the resource constraints for capital and labor (7), we can solve for traded and non-traded
labor as follows:
LT = LT
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, LN = LN
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, (37)
38
with
LTK =
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN ≶ 0, (38a)
LTP =
∂LT
∂P
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
P 2hkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNh
]
< 0, (38b)
LTµ =
∂LT
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LTPh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNPh
]
> 0, (38c)
LTλ¯ =
∂LT
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kN
kN − kT ≷ 0, (38d)
LNK =
∂LN
∂K
=
1
kN − kT ≷ 0, (38e)
LNP =
∂LN
∂P
= − 1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
P 2hkk
− σLL 1
W
(
kT
)2
h
]
> 0, (38f)
LNµ =
∂LN
∂µ
=
1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LTPh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
(
kT
)2
Ph
]
< 0, (38g)
LNλ¯ =
∂LN
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kT
kN − kT ≶ 0. (38h)
(38i)
Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (33) and for labor (38) into
the production functions, we can solve for traded output, Y T = LT f
(
kT
)
, and non-traded
output, Y N = LNh
(
kN
)
:
Y T = Y T
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, Y N = Y N
(
K,P, λ¯, µ
)
, (39)
with
Y TK =
∂Y T
∂K
= − f
kN − kT ≶ 0, (40a)
Y TP =
∂Y T
∂P
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
(P )2 hkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNhf
]
< 0, (40b)
Y Tµ =
∂Y T
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LT (Ph)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
Phkk
− σLL 1
W
kTkNPhf
]
> 0,(40c)
Y Tλ¯ =
∂Y T
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, (40d)
Y NK =
∂Y N
∂K
=
h
kN − kT ≷ 0, (40e)
Y NP =
∂Y N
∂P
= − 1
P (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
P 2hkk
− P
µ
σLL
1
W
(
kTh
)2]
> 0.(40f)
Y Nµ =
∂Y N
∂µ
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
PLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
P 2hkk
− P
µ
σLL
1
W
(
kTh
)2]
< 0, (40g)
Y Nλ¯ =
∂Y N
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kTh
kN − kT ≶ 0, (40h)
From (40b) and (40f), an appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources from the
traded to the non-traded sector which in turn raises the output of the latter. From (40a)
and (40e), a rise in the capital stock raises the output of the sector which is relatively more
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capital intensive. From (40d) and (40h), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth raises
labor supply and thereby increases output in the sector which is more labor intensive.
For clarity purpose, in the text, we write out short-run static solutions by expressing
output in terms of labor supply, i.e. Y T = Y T (K,L, P ) and Y N = Y N (K,L, P ). The
partial derivatives of sectoral output w. r. t. to labor are:
Y TL =
∂Y T
∂L
=
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, Y
N
L =
∂Y N
∂L
= − k
Th
kN − kT ≶ 0. (41)
Useful Properties
Making use of (40b) and (40f), (40a) and (40e), we deduce the following useful properties:
Y TP + P
Y NP
µ
= −σLL k
Th
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (42a)
Y TK +
P
µ
Y NK =
µf − Ph
µ (kT − kN ) =
P
µ
hk = fk, (42b)
Y TL + P
Y NL
µ
= W, (42c)
Y Tµ + P
Y Nµ
µ
= σLLkT
Ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (42d)
Y Tλ¯ + P
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L
λ¯
(
kNµf − kTPh)
µ (kN − kT ) = σL
L
λ¯
W > 0, (42e)
where we used the fact that µf ≡ P [h− hk (kN − kT )] and kNµf−kTPh = P (h− hKkN) (kN − kT ) =
µW
(
kN − kT ).
In addition, using the fact that rK = fk
[
kT (P, µ)
]
, the rental rate of capital denoted
by rK can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate P and the mark-up µ:
rK = rK (P, µ) , (43)
with partial derivatives given by:
rKP ≡
∂rK
∂P
=
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (44a)
rµP ≡
∂rK
∂µ
= − Ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≶ 0. (44b)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions (29), (31) and (39) into (5d) and (18), we obtain:
K˙ =
1
µ
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯
)− CN (λ¯, P )− δKK −GN , (45a)
P˙ = P
[
r? + δK − hk (P )
µ
]
. (45b)
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, P˜ the long-
term values of x = K,P , we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, P˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, P (t)− P˜
)T
, (46)
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where J is given by
J ≡
 b11 b12
b21 b22
 , (47)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, b12 = Y NP
µ
− CNP > 0, (48a)
b21 = 0, b22 = −P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) = Y TK
P˜
≶ 0. (48b)
Equilibrium Dynamics
By denoting ν the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix of
the linearized system (46) can be written as follows:
ν2 − 1
P˜
(
Y TK +
P˜
µ˜
Y NK − δK P˜
)
ν +
Y TK
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= 0. (49)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2× 2 matrix (47) is unambiguously
negative:42
Det J = b11b22 =
Y TK
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= − f˜ h˜
µP˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2 − δK Y TKP˜ < 0, (50)
and the trace denoted by Tr is given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
1
P˜
(
Y TK +
P˜
µ˜
Y NK
)
−−δK = hk
µ
− δK = r? > 0, (51)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hkµ = r
? + δK .
From (49), the characteristic root reads as:
νi ≡ 12
r? ±
√
(r?)2 − 4Y
T
K
P˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
) ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (52)
Using (51), then (52) can be rewritten as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
r? ±
[
Y TK
P˜
−
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)]}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (53)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (54)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P , the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (55a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (55b)
42Starting with the equality of labor marginal products across sectors, using the fact that fk =
P
µ
hk and
hk/µ = r
? + δK , it is straightforward to prove that b11 is positive in the case k
N > kT .
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where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given
by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (56)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, (57a)
b12 =
Y NP
µ
− CNP > 0, (57b)
where CNP is given by (32d).
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non-traded good
sector exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (54), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 = − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (58a)
ν2 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK > 0, (58b)
since we suppose that kN > kT .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν2 + δK) > 0, (59a)
Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (59b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν1 > 0, (59c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν2 + δK) < 0, (59d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν1 > 0. (59e)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)ν1−ν2(
Y N
P
µ
−CNP
) (−)
 , ω2 =
 1 (+)
0
 . (60)
Case kT > kN
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor ratio of the non traded sector. From (54), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK < 0, (61a)
ν2 = − f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0, (61b)
42
since we suppose that kT > kN .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν1 + δK) < 0, (62a)
Y TK = P˜ ν2 > 0, (62b)
P˜ hkkk
N
P
µ
= −ν2 < 0, (62c)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK) > 0, (62d)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜P˜ k˜
Nν2 < 0. (62e)
We write out eigenvector ωi associated with eigenvalue νi (with i = 1, 2), to determine
their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)
0
 , ω2 =
 0ν2−ν1(
Y N
P
µ
−CNP
) (+)
 . (63)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (19) around the steady-state:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+ Y TK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[
Y TP − CTP
] (
P (t)− P˜
)
. (64)
where CTP is given by (32b).
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and P (t), the solution for the stock of international
assets is given by follows:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+ Y TK
2∑
i=1
Bie
νit +
[
Y TP − CTP
] 2∑
i=1
Biω
i
2e
νit. (65)
Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
B(t)− B˜ =
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (66)
with
Φi =
Ni
νi − r? =
Y TK +
[
Y TP − CTP
]
ωi2
νi − r? , i = 1, 2. (67)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets
of equation (56) must be null and we must set B2 = 0. We obtain the linearized version of
the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
B0 − B˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (68)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
B(t)− B˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. (69)
Case kN > kT
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N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12,
= P˜ ν2
{
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]}
≷ 0, (70a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22, (70b)
= Y TK = P˜ ν1 < 0, (70c)
where (70c) follows from the fact that ω22 = 0. We made use of property (42a) together
with the fact that CTP = PCCP −PCNP to compute Y TP −CTP = −P˜
(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
−PCCP −
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK) ≷ 0.
The sign of Φ1 is ambiguous and reflects the impact of capital accumulation on the
foreign asset accumulation along a stable transitional path:
B˙(t) = Φ1K˙(t).
where K˙(t) = ν1B1eν1t. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account
and investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we will impose
thereafter:
Assumption 1 Φ1 < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.
The condition for the assumption to hold, i. e. N1 > 0, may be rewritten as follows:
ν2 > −ω
1
2
P˜
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)
]
. (71)
Note that, for all parametrization, we find Φ1 < 0.
Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω12,
= Y TK = P˜ ν2 > 0, (72a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y TP − CTP
)
ω22,
= P˜ ν1
{
1 +
ω22
P˜ ν1
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk)
]}
,≶ 0, (72b)
where (72b) follows from the fact that ω12 = 0. We made use of property (42a) together with
CTP = PCCP−PCNP to compute Y TP −CTP = −P˜
(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
−PCCP−σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK) ≷ 0.
C Derivation of the Current Account Equation
In this section, we derive the current account equation. Substituting the definition of lump-
sum taxes Z by using (8), the market clearing condition for non-traded goods (9) into (3)
we get:
B˙ = r?B + rKK(t) +WL− PCC − PI − Z,
= r?B +
(
rKK +WL
)− PCC − P (Y N
µ
− CN −GN
)
.
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Using the fact that LT + LN = L, KT + KN = K, , the dynamic equation for the
current account can be rewritten as follows:
B˙ = r?B +
[
WLT + rKKT
]
+
[
WLN + rKKN
]− P Y N
µ
− CT −GT ,
= r?B + Y T − CT −GT ,
where variable cost WLN + rKKN in the non-traded sector and output net of fixed cost in
that sector, i. e. Y
N
µ = Z
N , cancel each other.43
D Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case
of Inelastic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming
that labor supply is inelastically supplied. For clarity purpose, we further assume that the
non traded sector is perfectly competitive so that µ = 1 and abstract from physical capital
depreciation, i.e. δK = 0. These two assumptions will be relaxed in numerical analysis but
do not affect qualitatively the results.
The steady-state is given by follows:
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
= r?, (73a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ ,
)
µ
= CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
+ I˜ +GN , (73b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
= GT , (73c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜ −B0
)
= Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (73d)
We totally differentiate the steady-state (73) which yields in a matrix form:
hkkk
N
P 0 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
)
Y NK 0 −CNλ¯(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
? −CT
λ¯
0 −Φ1 1 0


dP˜
dK˜
dB˜
dλ¯
 =

0
dGN
dGT
0
 (74)
Determinant of matrix of coefficients is given by
D = hkkkNP
PCC˜σC
λ¯
[
Y NK − r?
αC
P˜
(
P˜ +Φ1
)]
. (75)
We have to consider two cases, depending on whether the non-traded sector is more or less
capital intensive than the traded sector :
D = −ν1ν2PCC˜σC
P˜ λ¯
> 0, if kT > kN , (76a)
D = −ν1PCC˜σC
P˜ λ¯
[
ν2 + αc
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
> 0, if kN > kT . (76b)
43In the traded sector which is perfectly competitive, we have : Y T = FLL
T + rKKT = WLT + rKKT .
Instead, in the non-traded sector which is imperfectly competitive we have: PZN = P HL
µ
LN +P HK
µ
KN or
PµZN = PY N = PHLL
N + PHKK
N =WLN + rKKN .
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The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of (76b) is positive if the following
inequality holds
ν2 > −αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2. (77)
From (38f), this inequality is satisfied since αC
r?
ν2
< 1.
D.1 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in GT
Case kN > kT
dC˜
dGT
= − 1
P˜c
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (78a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
αC λ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (78b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (78c)
dL˜T
dGT
=
αC
P˜ h˜
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (78d)
dK˜
dGT
= − αC
P˜ ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (78e)
dB˜
dGT
=
αC
ν2
[
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0. (78f)
Case kT > kN
dC˜
dGT
= − 1
P˜c
< 0, (79a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
αC λ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
> 0, (79b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (79c)
dL˜T
dGT
=
αC
P˜ h˜
> 0, (79d)
dK˜
dGT
= − αC
P˜ ν1
> 0, (79e)
dB˜
dGT
=
αC
ν1
< 0. (79f)
D.2 Long-Run Effects of a Rise in GN
Case kN > kT
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dC˜
dGN
= − P˜
P˜C
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (80a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
αcλ¯
σCC˜N
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (80b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (80c)
dL˜T
dGN
= − (1− αC)
h˜
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (80d)
dK˜
dGN
=
(1− αC)
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (80e)
dB˜
dGN
= −
P˜ (1− αC)
[
1 + 1ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0. (80f)
Case kT > kN
dC˜
dGN
= − P˜
P˜C
< 0, (81a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
αcλ¯
σC P˜ C˜N
> 0, (81b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (81c)
dL˜T
dGN
= −(1− αC)
h˜
< 0, (81d)
dK˜
dGN
=
(1− αC)
ν1
< 0, (81e)
dB˜
dGN
= − P˜ (1− αC)
ν1
> 0. (81f)
E Long-Run Effects of Permanent Fiscal Shocks: The Case
of Elastic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive the steady-state effects of permanent fiscal shocks by assuming
that labor supply is elastically supplied. For simplicity purpose, we further assume that
the non traded sector is perfectly competitive so that µ = 1 and abstract from capital
depreciation, i.e. δK = 0. These two assumptions will be relaxed in numerical analysis but
do not affect qualitatively the results.
Substituting first the appropriate short-un static solutions, the steady-state of the econ-
omy is obtained by setting K˙, P˙ , B˙ = 0 and is defined by the following set of equations:
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hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
= r?, (82a)
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GN = 0, (82b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GT = 0, (82c)
and the intertemporal solvency condition(
B0 − B˜
)
= Φ
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (82d)
The steady-state equilibrium composed by these four equations jointly determine P˜ , K˜, B˜
and λ¯.
We totally differentiate the system (82) evaluated at the steady-state which yields in a
matrix form:
hkkk
N
P 0 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
)
Y NK
(
Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)
0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK
(
Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
r?
0 −Φ1 0 1


dP˜
dK˜
dλ¯
dB˜
 =

0
dGN
dGT
0
 (83)
The determinant denoted by D of the matrix of coefficients is given by:
D ≡ hkkkNP
{
Y NK
(
Y Tλ¯ − CTλ¯
)− (Y Nλ¯ − CNλ¯ ) [Y TK + r?Φ1]} (84)
We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non-traded sector is more or
less capital intensive than the traded sector:
D = −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
> 0, if kT > kN , (85a)
D = −ν1ν2
P˜ λ¯
{(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
)
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)2}
> 0, (85b)
if kN > kT ,
where we used the fact that and fkN−PhkT =W (kN − kT ) together with−P (kNν2 + kT ν1) ≡
W if kT > kN or −P (kNν1 + kT ν2) ≡W if kN > kT .
E.1 A Permanent Rise in GT
We computed useful expressions:
Y NK Y
T
λ¯ − Y TKY Nλ¯ = σL
L˜
λ¯
h˜f˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) , (86a)
P ′CY
T
K − (1− αC)PCY NK = −
PC
P˜
αC f˜ + (1− αC) P˜ h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
)
 , (86b)
Y Nλ¯ − P ′CCλ¯ =
1
λ¯
−σLL˜k˜T h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σCC˜N
 , (86c)
Y TK − (1− αC)PCCλ¯ =
P˜
λ¯
σLL˜k˜N f˜
P˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σC C˜T
P˜
 . (86d)
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If kN > kT , eqs. (86) rewrite as follows:
Y NK Yλ¯ − Y TKY Nλ¯ = −P˜ ν1ν2σL
L˜
λ¯
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (87a)
P ′CY
T
K − (1− αC)PCY NK = −PC (ν2 − αCr?) < 0, (87b)
Y Nλ¯ − P ′CCλ¯ =
1
λ¯
[
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
]
≶ 0, (87c)
Y TK − (1− αC)PCCλ¯ =
P˜
λ¯
[
σC
C˜T
P˜
− σLL˜k˜Nν1
]
> 0. (87d)
If kT > kN , eqs. (86) write as follows:
Y NK Y
T
λ¯ − Y TKY Nλ¯ = σL
L˜
λ¯
f˜ν1 < 0, (88a)
P ′CY
T
K − (1− αC)PCY NK = −PC (ν1 − αCr?) > 0, (88b)
Y Nλ¯ − P ′CCλ¯ =
1
λ¯
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
)
> 0, (88c)
Y TK − (1− αC)PCCλ¯ =
P˜
λ¯
[
σC
C˜T
P˜
− σLL˜k˜Nν2
]
≷ 0. (88d)
Case kN > kT
If kN > kT , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GT are:
dC˜
dGT
=
σCC˜
P˜ λ¯
ν1ν2
D
< 0, (89a)
dλ¯
dGT
= −ν1ν2
P˜D
> 0, (89b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (89c)
dK˜
dGT
=
ν1
P˜ λ¯D
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
≶ 0, (89d)
dB˜
dGT
= − ν1
λ¯D
[
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)](
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
≷ 0, (89e)
where dB˜dGT = Φ1
dK˜
dGT .
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GT are:
dC˜
dGT
= − σCC˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0, (90a)
dλ¯
dGT
=
λ¯(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (90b)
dP˜
dGT
= 0, (90c)
dK˜
dGT
=
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν1 − σCC˜N
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (90d)
dB˜
dGT
= −
P˜
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν1 − σCC˜N
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0. (90e)
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E.2 A Permanent Rise in GN
Case kN > kT
If kN > kT , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GN are:
dC˜
dGN
=
σCC˜
λ¯
ν1ν2
D
[
1 +
r?
ν2
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)]
< 0, (91a)
dλ¯
dGN
= −ν1ν2
D
[
1 +
r?
ν2
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)]
> 0, (91b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (91c)
dK˜
dGN
= − ν1
λ¯D
(
σC
C˜T
P˜
− σLL˜k˜Nν1
)
> 0, (91d)
dB˜
dGN
=
ν1P˜
λ¯D
[
1 +
ω12
P˜ ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)](
σC
C˜T
P˜
− σLL˜k˜Nν1
)
< 0. (91e)
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the steady-state changes after a permanent rise in GN are:
dC˜
dGN
= − σCC˜P˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) < 0, (92a)
dλ¯
dGN
=
λ¯P˜(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) > 0, (92b)
dP˜
dGN
= 0, (92c)
dK˜
dGN
= −
P˜
(
σLL˜k˜
Nν2 − σC C˜TP˜
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) ≶ 0, (92d)
dB˜
dGN
=
P˜ 2
(
σLL˜k˜
Nν2 − σC C˜TP˜
)
ν1
(
σLW˜ L˜+ σCPCC˜
) ≷ 0. (92e)
F Derivation of Formal Solutions after Temporary Fiscal
Shocks
In this section, we provide the main steps to derive formal solutions for key variables after
temporary fiscal shocks, by applying the procedure developed by Schubert and Turnovsky
[2002]. For simplicity purpose, we assume that µ = 1 and δK = 0.
F.1 Steady-State
As in Schubert and Turnovsky [2002], we define a viable steady-state i starting at time Ti
to be one that is consistent with long run solvency, given the stocks of capital, KTi and
foreign bonds, BTi . We rewrite the system of steady-state equations for an arbitrary period
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i (with i = 0, 1, 2):
hk
[
k˜N
(
P˜i
)]
= r?, (93a)
Y N
(
K˜i, P˜i
)
− C˜Ni −GNi = 0, (93b)
r?B˜i + Y T
(
K˜i, P˜i
)
− C˜Ti −GTi = 0, (93c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜i −BTi
)
= Φ1
(
K˜i −KTi
)
. (93d)
F.2 Steady-State Functions
The new consistent procedure consists in two steps. In a first step, we solve the sys-
tem (93a)-(93c) for P˜i, K˜i and B˜i as functions of the marginal utility of wealth, λ¯i, the
government expenditure on the traded and non-traded goods, i.e. GT and GN . Totally
differentiating equations (93a)-(93c) yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
P 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
)
Y NK 0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?


dP˜i
dK˜i
dB˜i
 =

0
P ′CCλ¯dλ¯i + dG
N
i
(1− αC)PCCλ¯dλ¯i + dGTi
 (94)
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯i and fiscal policy parameters,
GTi , G
N
i , determine the following steady-state values:
P˜i = constant, (95a)
K˜i = K
(
λ¯i, G
N
i
)
, (95b)
B˜i = B
(
λ¯i, G
T
i , G
N
i
)
, (95c)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜i
∂λ¯i
=
hkkk
N
P PCP
′
Cr
?
G
= −σC C˜
N
i
λ¯i
(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
h˜i
≶ 0, (96a)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜i
∂λ¯i
=
hkkk
N
P PC
(−P ′CY TK + (1− αC)PCY NK )
G
,
=
PCC˜i
λ¯i
σC
Y NK r
?
αCr? − h˜i(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
 ,
= −PCC˜i
λ¯i
σC
r?P˜ h˜i
[
αC f˜i + (1− αC) P˜ih˜i
]
< 0, (96b)
and
KGT ≡
∂K˜i
∂GTi
= 0, (97a)
BGT ≡
∂B˜i
∂GTi
=
1
r?
> 0, (97b)
and
KGN ≡
∂K˜i
∂GNi
=
hkkk
N
P uccr
?
G
=
(
k˜Ni − k˜Ti
)
h˜i
≷ 0, (98a)
BGN ≡
∂B˜i
∂GNi
= −hkkk
N
P uccY
T
K
G
=
f˜i
h˜i
1
r?
> 0, (98b)
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where G ≡ hkkkNP uccY NK r? which simplifies as follows :
G ≡ f˜ h˜
P˜ 2
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2uccr? < 0. (99)
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯i by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (93d):
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯i = dBTi − Φ1dKTi − [BGN − Φ1KGN ] dGNi −BGT dGTi , (100)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯i as a function of initial stocks at time
Ti and government spending:
λ¯ = λ
(
KTi , BTi , G
T , GN
)
, (101)
with
λK ≡ ∂λ¯i
∂KTi
= − Φ1
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
< 0, (102a)
λB ≡ ∂λ¯i
∂BTi
=
1
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
< 0, (102b)
λGT ≡
∂λ¯i
∂GTi
= − BGT
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
> 0, (102c)
λGN ≡
∂λ¯i
∂GNi
= − [BGN − Φ1KGN ]
[Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
> 0. (102d)
From (102), we obtain the following properties:
λB [Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯] = 1, (103a)
λBBGT = −λGT , (103b)
λB [BGN − Φ1KGN ] = −λGN . (103c)
F.3 Formal Solutions for Temporary Fiscal Shocks
We assume that the small open economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, denoted
by the subscript i = 0:
K0 = K˜0 = K
(
λ¯0, G
N
0
)
= K
(
λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
, GN0
)
, (104a)
B0 = B˜0 = B
(
λ¯0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
= B
(
λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
, GT0 , G
N
0
)
, (104b)
λ0 = λ¯0 = λ
(
K0, B0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)
. (104c)
We suppose now that government expenditure changes unexpectedly at time t = 0 from
the original level GT0 (resp. G
N
0 ) to level G
T
1 (resp. G
N
1 ) over the period 0 ≤ t < T , and
reverts back at time T permanently to its initial level, GTT = GT2 = GT0 (resp. GNT = GN2 =
GN0 ).
Period 1 (0 ≤ t < T )
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Whereas the fiscal expansion is implemented, the economy follows unstable transitional
paths:
K(t) = K˜1 +B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (105a)
P (t) = P˜1 + ω12B1e
ν1t + ω22B2e
ν2t, (105b)
B(t) = B˜1 +
[(
B0 − B˜1
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +
+Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (105c)
with the steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 given by the following functions (set i = 1 into
(95b)-(95c)):
K˜1 = K
(
λ¯, GN1
)
, (106a)
B˜1 = B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)
, (106b)
where the marginal utility of wealth remains constant over periods 1 and 2 at level λ¯1 =
λ¯2 = λ¯ after its initial jump at time t = 0.
Period 2 (t ≥ T )
Once government spending reverts back to its initial level, the economy follows stable
paths
K(t) = K˜2 +B′1e
ν1t, (107a)
P (t) = P˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
ν1t, (107b)
B(t) = B˜2 +Φ1B′1e
ν1t, (107c)
with the steady-state values K˜2 and B˜2 given by the following functions (set i = 2 into
(95b)-(95c)):
K˜2 = K
(
λ¯, GN2
)
, (108a)
B˜2 = B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)
. (108b)
During the transition period 1, the economy accumulates capital and foreign assets.
Since this period is unstable, it would lead the nation to violate its intertemporal budget
constraint. By contrast, the adjustment process taking place in period 2 is stable and must
satisfy the economy’s intertemporal budget constraint. At the same time, the zero-root
problem requires the equilibrium value of marginal utility of wealth to adjust once-and-
for-all when the shock hits the economy. So λ remains constant over the periods 1 and 2.
The aim of the two-step method is to calculate the deviation of λ such that the country
satisfies one single and overall intertemporal budget constraint, given the new relevant
initial conditions, KT and BT , prevailing when the shock ends and accumulated over the
unstable period. Therefore, for the country to remain intertemporally solvent, we require:
BT − B˜2 = Φ1
(
KT − K˜2
)
. (109)
In order to determine the three constants B1, B2, and B′1, and the equilibrium value of
marginal utility of wealth, we impose three conditions:
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1. Initial conditions K(0) = K0, B(0) = B0 must be met.
2. Economic aggregates K and P remain continuous at time T .
3. The intertemporal solvency constraint (109) must hold implying that the net foreign
assets remain continuous at time T .
Set t = 0 in solution (105a), and evaluating first at time t = T , equate (105a) and
(107a), (105b) and (107b):
K˜1 +B1 +B2 = K0, (110a)
K˜1 +B1eν1T +B2eν2T = K˜2 +B′1e
ν1T , (110b)
P˜1 + ω12B1e
ν1T + ω22B2e
ν2T = P˜2 + ω12B
′
1e
ν1T , (110c)
where we used the continuity condition.
Evaluating KT and BT from respectively (105a) and (105c), substituting into (109),
and using functions of steady-state values K˜i and B˜i given by (104) (for i = 0), (106) (for
i = 1), and (108) (for i = 2), the intertemporal solvency condition can be rewritten as
B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)
+
[ (
B
(
λ0, G
T
0 , G
N
0
)−B (λ¯, GT1 , GN1 ))− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2]er?T +Φ1B1eν1T
+Φ2B2eν2T −B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)
= Φ1
[
K
(
λ¯, GN1
)
+B1eν1T +B2eν2T −K
(
λ¯, GN2
)]
. (111)
Then, we approximate the steady-state changes with the differentials:
K˜1 − K˜0 ≡ K
(
λ¯, GN1
)−K (λ0, GN0 ) = Kλ¯dλ¯+KGNdGN , (112a)
K˜2 − K˜1 ≡ K
(
λ¯, GN2
)−K (λ¯, GN1 ) = −KGNdGN , (112b)
B˜1 − B˜0 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GT1 , G
N
1
)−B (λ0, GT0 , GN0 ) = Bλ¯dλ¯+BGT dGT +BGNdGN ,(112c)
B˜2 − B˜1 ≡ B
(
λ¯, GT2 , G
N
2
)−B (λ¯, GT1 , GN1 ) = −BGT dGT −BGNdGN , (112d)
where dλ¯ ≡ λ¯− λ0.
By substituting these expressions in (110) and (111), we obtain finally
B1 +B2 = −Kλ¯dλ¯−KGNdGN , (113a)
B1e
ν1T +B2eν2T −B′1eν1T = −KGNdGN , (113b)
ω12B1e
ν1T + ω22B2e
ν2T − ω12B′1eν1T = 0, (113c)
and
B1Υ1 +B2Υ2 +Bλ¯dλ¯ = Ω1, (114)
where we set
Υ1 ≡ Φ1, (115a)
Υ2 ≡ Φ2 + (Φ1 − Φ2) e−ν1T , (115b)
Ω1 ≡
[(
vgj − Φ1Kgj
)
e−r
?T − vgj
]
dgj j = T,N, (115c)
where KGT = 0.
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Case kN > kT
We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
C˜N
λ¯
σC
ν2
< 0, (116a)
KGN =
1
ν2
> 0, (116b)
Bλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν2r?
[(1− αC) ν2 − αCν1] < 0, (116c)
BGN = −
P˜ ν1
ν2r?
> 0, (116d)
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯) = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν2r?
[
ν2 + αC
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
< 0, (116e)
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) =
P˜
ν2r?
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
> 0, (116f)
Υ2 = −P˜
[
1 +
C˜N
P˜
σC
ν2
ω12e
−ν1T
]
, (116g)
Bλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν2
[
ν2 + αC
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2e
−ν1T
]
< 0, (116h)
Ω1Kλ¯ +Bλ¯KGNdG
N = −PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r? (ν2)
2
{
αC
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−r
?T + (1− αC) ν2
}
dGN < 0,
(116i)
and BGT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜T ν2 + k˜Nν1 = −WP˜ and the following
expression:
Ω1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGT +
P˜
r?ν2
{
ν1 +
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−r
?T
}
dGN . (117)
Case kT > kN
We write out some useful expressions
Kλ¯ = −
C˜N
λ¯
σC
ν1
> 0, (118a)
KGN =
1
ν1
< 0, (118b)
Bλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
ν1r?
[(1− αC) ν1 − αCν2] < 0, (118c)
BGN = −
P˜ ν2
ν1r?
> 0, (118d)
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯) = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?
< 0 (118e)
(BGN − Φ1KGN ) =
P˜
r?
> 0, (118f)
Υ2 = −P˜
[
1 +
C˜N
P˜
σC
ν1
ω22
(
1− e−ν1T )] < 0, (118g)
Bλ¯ −Υ2Kλ¯ = −
PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν1
[
ν1 + αC
r?
ν1
C˜N
P˜
σCω
2
2
(
1− e−ν1T )] ≷ 0,(118h)
Ω1Kλ¯ +Bλ¯KGNdG
N = −PCC˜
λ¯
σC
r?ν1
[
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
]
> 0, (118i)
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and BGT = 1/r? > 0. We used the fact that k˜T ν1 + k˜Nν2 = −WP˜ and the following
expression:
Ω1 = − 1
r?
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGT +
P˜
r?ν1
(
ν2 + ν1e−r
?T
)
dGN . (119)
Case kN > kT
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dGT
=
αC
(
1− e−r?T )
P˜ ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (120a)
B2
dGT
= 0, (120b)
B′1
dGT
=
B1
dGT
, (120c)
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (120d)
where, from (113a),
B1
dGT
can be written also as follows
B1
dGT
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (121)
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non traded good are given
by:
B1
dGN
= −
[(
1− e−ν2T )− αC (1− e−r?T )]
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= −(1− αC)
(
1− e−ν2T )+ αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0, (122a)
B2
dGN
= −e
−ν2T
ν2
< 0, (122b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
< 0, (122c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−ν2T ) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
uccP˜
(PC)
2
ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= λGN
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
 ≶ 0, (122d)
where we used expression (80b) to obtain (122d). From (113a),
B1
dGT
and
B2
dGT
can also be
written as follows:
B1
dGN
+
B2
dGN
= −Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN and
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T . (123)
Case kT > kN
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The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the traded good are given by:
B1
dGT
=
αC
ν1P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)
< 0, (124a)
B2
dGT
= 0, (124b)
B′1
dGT
=
B1
dGT
, (124c)
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (124d)
The solutions for a rise in the government expenditure on the non traded good are given
by:
B1
dGN
= − 1
ν1
[
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
]
,
= − 1
ν1
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
> 0, (125a)
B2
dGN
= 0, (125b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
+KGN e
−ν1T
= − 1
ν1
[(
1− e−ν1T )− αC (1− e−r?T )] < 0, (125c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (125d)
G Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in GN
In this section, we investigate in details the dynamics of key variables after a permanent
and temporary rise in GN , considering both cases: kT > kN and kN > kT . Transitional
paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 4 for kT > kN and kN > kT , respectively. To keep
analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e. we set σL = 0. Since these
two parameters do no affect qualitatively the results, we further assume that the non-traded
sector is perfectly competitive, i.e. we set µ = 1, and we set the rate of depreciation of
physical capital to zero.
G.1 Long-Run Effects
We derive the ultimate steady-state changes of the economic key variables after a permanent
rise in government spending on the non-traded good by differentiating the functions (95)
w.r.t GN :
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (126a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+KGN ≷ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT ,(126b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGN ≶ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (126c)
where analytical expressions are given by the set of equations (80) and (81).
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We turn now to the long run changes of macroeconomic aggregates after a temporary
fiscal expansion by considering two cases.
Case kN > kT
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
 < 0. (127)
The sign of the change in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth can be
determined by noting that expression (127) tends towards zero whenever the parameter
T tends towards zero and tends towards λGN when the parameter tends towards ∞. In
addition, the term in square brackets is an increasing and monotonic function of parameter
T . Therefore, the change in λ¯ after a temporary rise in government spending lies in the
range [0, λGN ]. Consequently, we can deduce that expression (127) has a positive sign.
Using the functions (95), we deduce the long run changes for the real consumption, the
stock of physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (128a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (128b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (128c)
where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0, and Bλ¯ < 0.
The change of the period 1 steady-state value K˜1 compared to its initial (given) value
K˜0 is given by:
dK˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KGN ,
=
(1− αC) + αC
[
1 + r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2e
ν1T
]
e−r?T
ν2
[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] > 0, (129)
where we have substituted the expressions of Kλ¯ < 0 given by (116a),
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣
temp
> 0 given
by (127) and KGN > 0 given by (116b).
The change of the period 1 steady-state value B˜1 compared to its initial (given) value
B˜0 is given by :
dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGN , (130)
= − P˜
r∗ν2
1[
1 + αC r
?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]{ ((1− αC) ν2 − αCν1)[1 + r?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
](
1− e−r?T
)
+
[
1 + αC
r?
(ν2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
ν1
}
≷ 0,
where we have substituted the expressions of Bλ¯ < 0 given by (116c),
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0 given
by (127) and BGN > 0 given by (116d). The sign of expression (130) remains indeterminate
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because it is the sum of two terms of opposite signs. The first term on the right-hand side
of (130) is negative and is an increasing function of parameter T and may be dominated
by the second term BGN which is positive. We may infer that the shorter-lasting the rise
in government expenditure, the more likely a higher steady-state value B˜1 compared to its
initial (given) value B˜0.
It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of
international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGN R Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
, (131)
where BGN > 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= λGN > 0. The key factor that determines the
magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign assets is the period of implemen-
tation of the government policy. More specifically, simulations indicate that there exists
a time T = T´ for which the two changes are equal. For high durations of the policy, i.
e. T > T´ , the deterioration of the net foreign asset position features a greater magnitude
after a temporary fiscal expansion compared to a permanent policy. This result is reversed
when the public policy is implemented over a short period, say T < T´ .
From steady-state changes following permanent and temporary rise in government ex-
penditure falling on the non-traded good, we can deduce the following inequalities whatever
the duration of the public policy:
K˜temp < K0 < K˜perm < K˜1, (132a)
B˜temp < B˜perm < B0, if T > T´ , (132b)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0, if T < T´ . (132c)
Case kT > kN
The equilibrium change of λ¯ is:
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (133)
From (133), we see that that the change of λ after a temporary change in GN is smaller
than that after a permanent increase in GN but goes in the same direction. Hence we
deduce the following inequality:
0 <
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
<
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
. (134)
From the functions (95), we deduce long run changes of real consumption, the stock of
physical capital, and the stock of traded bonds:
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (135a)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (135b)
dB˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (135c)
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where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ > 0, and Bλ¯ < 0.
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial
(given) values K0 and B0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+KGN ,
=
(1− αC) + αCe−r?T
ν1
< 0, (136a)
dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGN ,
= − P˜
r?ν1
{
(1− αC) r? − [(1− αC) ν1 − αCν2] e−r?T
}
> 0. (136b)
where we have evaluated the signs of (136a)-(136b) by making use of (118a)-(118d) and
(81b).
From (134), because the change in the equilibrium value of λ¯ following a temporary
change in GN is smaller compared with that after a permanent increase in GN , by making
use of (135b)-(135c), (126b)-(126c), and (136a)-(136b), we are able to deduce the following
inequalities:
K˜1 < K˜perm < K0 < K˜temp, (137a)
B˜temp < B0 < B˜perm < B˜1. (137b)
G.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in GN
Case kN > kT
The initial jump of P is obtained by setting t = 0 in (105b) and then by differentiating
with respect to GN :
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0. (138)
From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium value
of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of the relative price of the non-traded
good, we get the initial jump of real consumption:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ CP
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
P˜
[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
− C˜NσCω12
PC
[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
=
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
+
(1− αC)
PC
C˜NσCω
1
2[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] < 0. (139)
From (139), we deduce the following inequality
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (140)
The rise in the marginal utility of wealth and the initial appreciation in the relative price of
the non-traded good lowers C(0) below its steady-state value. Along the stable adjustment,
real consumption rises:
C˙(t) = −CσCαC P˙ (t)
P (t)
> 0, (141)
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where the relative price of the non-traded good depreciates along the stable adjustment
when the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive. Otherwise, the relative
price of the non-traded good’s and thus the real consumption’s temporal paths are flat.
The dynamics of the key economic variables after a permanent rise in government spend-
ing falling on the non-traded good are as follows:
K˙(t) = −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN > 0, (142a)
P˙ (t) = −ν1ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0, (142b)
B˙(t) = −ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0. (142c)
Note that the long run changes of K˜ and B˜ are opposite to those after a permanent rise
GT .
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the initial change in the real consumption is solely affected by the change
in the equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth and jumps immediately to its new
lower steady-state level:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
=
dC˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (143)
Over time, investment decreases and the stock of international assets rises:
I(t) = −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN < 0, (144a)
CA(t) = −ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
eν1tdGN > 0. (144b)
As it shall be useful later, we calculate the slope of the trajectory after a permanent fiscal
expansion in the (K,B)-space by differentiating the solutions for B(t) and for K(t) w.r.t
time:
dB(t)
dK(t)
=
ν1Φ1 B1dGN e
ν1t
ν1
B1
dGN e
ν1t
= −P˜ < 0. (145)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ .
G.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in GN
Case kN > kT
First, we evaluate the constants B1/dGN and B2/dGN :
B1
dGN
= − B2
dGN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN ,
= − dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0. (146a)
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T = −
e−ν2T
ν2
< 0. (146b)
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By evaluating the formal solution for P (t) at time t = 0, differentiating with respect to
GN , and remembering that dP˜1/dGN = 0, we get the initial jump of P :
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
B1
dGN
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−ν2T )− ω12αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
= −ω12
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
> 0,(147)
where we have inserted the steady-state change of the capital stock after a permanent fiscal
expansion falling on the non-traded good given by (80e). From (147), we can see that the
magnitude of the initial appreciation in the real exchange after a temporary fiscal expansion
may be magnified if the policy is implemented during a long period, i. e. for T > 1ν1 ln [αC ].
By making use of the short run static solution (29) for C, we obtain the response of real
consumption at time t = 0:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ CP
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (148)
It is now convenient to evaluate the magnitude of the downward jump of real consumption
after a temporary rise in GN compared with that after a permanent fiscal expansion by
computing the following expression:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
[
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
+CP
[
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
]
≷ 0. (149)
(150)
From (149), we deduce the following inequality:
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0. (151)
The initial response of the investment flow following a temporary rise in GN is given by:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
= −ν1
(1− αC)
(
1− e−ν2T )+ αC (e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + αC r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
− e−ν2T ,
= −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
− e−ν2T ≷ 0.(152)
The sign of expression (152) is not clear-cut. As investment plays the role of clearing the
non-traded goods market, its sign depends on the jumps of the relative price of the non-
traded good and of the marginal utility of wealth. On the one hand, the relative price of
the non-traded good appreciates which raises the return on domestic capital by reducing
kN . On the other hand, the increase in P raises the capital user cost. The latter effect is
larger, the shorter-living the fiscal shock.
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To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of investment af-
ter a temporary rise in GN , we first linearize the non-traded good market clearing condition
in the neighborhood of the steady-state:
I(t)− I˜ = Y NK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
(
Y NP − CNP
) (
P (t)− P˜
)
.
Using the fact that dI˜ = Y NK dK˜+
(
Y NP − CNP
)
dP˜ −CN
λ¯
dλ¯
∣∣
temp
−dGN , and evaluating the
expression above at time t = 0, we get:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Y NP − CNP
) dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ σC
C˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1. (153)
Using the fact that dP˜ = 0, we evaluate the initial jump of P which is given by:
dP (0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ω12
dB1
dGN
= −ω12
[
KGN
(
1− e−ν2T )+Kλ¯ dλ¯dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= ω12
[
−
(
1− e−ν2T )
ν2
+
σC
ν2
C˜N
λ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
, (154)
where we substituted KGN = 1/ν2 and Kλ¯ = −σCν2 C˜
N
λ¯
. Substituting (154) into (153) and
using the fact that ω12 =
ν1−ν2
(Y NP −CNP )
, the initial reaction of investment finally rewrites as:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
ν2 − ν1
ν2
)(
1− e−ν2T )+ σCC˜N
λ¯
ν1
ν2
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− 1. (155)
Eq. (155) corresponds to eq. (20) in the text.
By differentiating the formal solution (105c) over period 1 for B(t) with respect to time,
then evaluating the resulting expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to GN ,
we obtain the initial response of the current account following a temporary fiscal expansion:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2
B2
dGN
}
+ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
+ ν2Φ2
B2
dGN
. (156)
In order to simplify the solution (156), we rewrite the term in square brackets as follows
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−
[
Φ1
B1
dGN
+Φ2
B2
dGN
]
= − [Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− [BGN − Φ1KGN ] + [Φ1 − Φ2]
B2
dGN
,
= −λGN
λB
(1− e−ν2T )− ν2
(
e−r?T − e−ν2T )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
]
+ λGNλB + 1ν2 C˜NσCω12KGN e−ν2T ,
=
λGN
λB
eν2T − P˜
r?
e−r
?T +
P˜
ν2r?
[
ν2 +
r?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
e−ν2T ,
= − P˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0, (157)
where we have substituted the expression of the change in the equilibrium value of the
marginal utility of wealth given by (122d), we made use of properties (103), expression
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(116f) and inserted these useful expressions:
B1
dGN
= − B2
dGN
−Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
−KGN < 0,
Φ1 − Φ2 = − 1
ν2
C˜NσCω
1
2 > 0,
B2
dGN
= −KGN e−ν2T < 0,
(BGN − Φ1KGN )[
ν2 + r
?
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] = P˜
ν2r?
> 0.
By inserting (157) into (156), the expression of the initial response of the current account
reduces to:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1P˜
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
dK˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
−P˜ e−r?T + P˜ e−ν2T ,
= −P˜
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
−P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
< 0, (158)
where we simplified several expressions as follows:
Kλ¯
uCC P˜
P 2C
ν2 =
P˜ C˜N
PCC˜
= αC > 0,
ν2Φ2 − ν1Φ1 = −P˜ ν2 + P˜ ν1
(
1 +
1
ν2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
)
< 0.
To derive a more easily interpretable expression for the initial reaction of the current
account after a temporary rise in GN , we use eq. (146a):
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
,
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
− ν1Φ1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
[(
1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
,
= −P˜
(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)
− ν1Φ1 (1− αC)
ν2
(
1− αCΨ˜
) [(1− e−ν2T )+ ( αC
1− αC
)(
e−r
?T − e−ν2T
)]
< 0,(159)
where 0 < Ψ˜ ≡ − r?
ν22
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2 < 1. Eq. (159) corresponds to eq. (21) in the text.
Now, we investigate the dynamics for K(t) and P (t) over the unstable period (0, T ),
say period 1:
K˙(t) = ν1
B1
dGN
eν1tdGN + ν2
B2
dGN
eν2tdGN R 0, (160a)
P˙ (t) = ν1ω12
B1
dGN
eν1tdGN < 0, (160b)
where B1/dGN < 0, B2/dGN < 0, and ω12 < 0. As it can be seen from (160a), investment
dynamics are the result of two opposite forces. If the initial investment flow is positive, it
must be negative at time t˜ along the trajectory:
t˜ =
1
ν1 − ν2 ln
[
−ν2B2/dG
N
ν1B1/dGN
]
, (161)
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where the term in square brackets is less than one under the condition that the initial
investment flow is positive (see eq. (152)), otherwise the trajectory for investment is mono-
tonic.
The current account dynamics over period 1 are described by the following equation:
CA(t) =
[
P˜ e−ν2(T −t)
(
1− e−ν1(T −t)
)
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
eν1t
]
dGN < 0. (162)
We turn now to the analysis of transitional dynamics over the stable period 2. By
making use of standard methods, the adjustments of the stock of physical capital, the
relative price of non tradables P and the stock of international assets are driven by the
following equations:
K˙(t) = ν1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t > 0, (163a)
P˙ (t) = ν1ω12
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0, (163b)
B˙(t) = ν1Φ1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0. (163c)
Evaluate (163c) at time t+, and calculate dCA (T ) = CA (T +) − CA (T −), we can
see that the current account is continuous in the neighborhood of time T . Thus we have
CA (T −) = CA (T +). Performing the same procedure of investment, we obtain:
dI (T )
dGN
= −ν2 B2dGN e
ν2T = 1. (164)
When the policy is removed at time T , i. e. government spending falls by an amount
equals to dGN (T ) ≡ GN2 − GN1 ≡ −dGN , investment must rise to guarantee that the
market-clearing condition holds at time T .
Case kT > kN
Like after a permanent fiscal expansion, an unexpected transitory rise in government
spending on the non-traded good leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded
good both in the short run and in the long run. To evaluate the investment dynamics,
we differentiate the solution for K(t) given by (105a) with respect to time, evaluate the
resulting expression at time t = 0, and then differentiate with respect to GN , keeping in
mind that B2/dGN = 0 if kT > kN :
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
= −ν1 1
ν1
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
,
= αC
(
1− e−r?T
)
− 1 < 0,
=
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
− e−r?T < 0. (165)
The second line of eq. (165) corresponds to eq. (18) in the text
Applying standard methods, the initial response of the current account following a
temporary fiscal expansion on the non-traded good is given by:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
{
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN
}
+ ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
,
= P˜ (1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (166)
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where ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
= P˜
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
+ e−r
?T
]
. Eq. (166) corresponds to eq. (19)
in the text.
In deriving (166), we have also simplified the term in square braces as follows:
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN
= −
{[
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ (BGN − Φ1KGN )
]}
,
=
λGN
λB
e−r
?T = − P˜
r?
e−r
?T < 0. (167)
We investigate the dynamics of the stocks of physical capital and traded bonds by taking
the time derivative of formal solutions prevailing over period 1:
I(t) = K˙(t) = ν1
B1
dGN
dGNeν1t,
= −ν1 dK˜dGN
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
dGNeν1t − e−r?T dGNeν1t < 0, (168)
and
CA(t) = −r?
[(
n
(
λ¯, GN1
)−B (λ0, GN0 ))+Φ1 B1dGN
]
dGNer
?t + ν1Φ1
B1
dGN
dGNeν1t,
= P˜
[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T
)
eν1t − e−r?T
(
er
?t − eν1t
)]
dGN ≷ 0. (169)
There exists a time t = t´ such that the current account changes of sign:
t´ = − 1
ν2
ln
[
e−r?T
(1− αC) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T
]
, (170)
where the term in square brackets is positive and lower than one. Over period 1, the
current account improves first while the negative investment flow more than outweighs
the smoothing effect. At time t´, these two effects cancel each other and after this date, the
current account deteriorates as the smoothing behavior predominates, such that CA (T −) <
0. To see it more formally, we evaluate (169) at time T −:
CA
(
T−
)
= P˜ eν1T
[(
1− e−ν1T )− αC (1− e−r?T )]dGN < 0. (171)
At time T −, the investment flow is also negative:
I
(T −) = −e−ν2T [1− (1− αC)(1− er?T )] < 0. (172)
We have now to compare the slope of the trajectory after a transitory fiscal expansion over
period 0 ≤ t < t´ in the (K,B)-space with the slope of the trajectory after a permanent
fiscal expansion:
dB(t)
dK(t)
=
−P˜ e−r?(T −t) + ν1Φ1 B1dGN eν1t
ν1
B1
dGN e
ν1t
,
= − P˜
{[
(1− αC)
(
1− e−r?T )+ e−r?T ] eν1t − e−r?(T −t)}
[(1− αC) (1− e−r?T ) + e−r?T ] eν1t , (173)
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where we have substituted the expression of the constant B1/dGN . Over period 0 ≤ t´ < t,
the numerator is positive and the denominator is negative. Thus the slope of the trajectory
is negative in the (K,B)-space. Comparing the terms in numerator and in denominator
of (173), it is straightforward to show that the slope in absolute terms is lower than P˜ .
Therefore, the slope is negative and lower (in absolute terms) than the slope of the trajectory
after a permanent fiscal expansion (equal to −P˜ ).
We turn now to the investigation of transitional dynamics of key macroeconomic vari-
ables over the stable period, say period 2. By adopting the standard procedure, we get:
I(t) = K˙(t) = ν1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t > 0 (174a)
CA(t) = B˙(t) = ν1Φ1
B′1
dGN
dGNeν1t < 0. (174b)
Since the period 2 is a stable period, the dynamics are monotonic. If we can determine
the sign of (174) at time t = T +, we are able to evaluate the transitional dynamics over
the entire period:
I
(T +) = − [(1− αC) (eν1T − e−ν2T )− (1− e−ν2T )]dGN > 0, (175a)
CA
(T +) = P˜ [(1− αC) (eν1T − e−ν2T )− (1− e−ν2T )]dGN < 0. (175b)
From (171) and (175b), we deduce that the current account is continuous in the neighbor-
hood of T , such that CA (T −) = CA (T +) < 0. At the opposite, from (172) and (175a),
we see that investment is not continuous in the neighborhood of T since at this date, it
must clear the non tradable market. To see it formally, we write the non tradable clearing
market condition at time T − and at time T +:
I
(
T−
)
= Y N
[
K
(T −) , P (T −)]− CN [λ (T −) , P (T −)]−GN1 < 0, (176a)
I
(T +) = Y N [K (T +) , P (T +)]− CN [λ (T +) , P (T +)]−GN2 > 0, (176b)
where GN2 = G
N
0 . Goods market equilibrium is subject to two discrete perturbations: one
at time t = 0 when the government raises the public spending, the other at time t = T when
the policy is permanently removed. Since capital is a predetermined variable, it cannot jump
neither at time t = 0 or at time t = T . In addition, the marginal utility of wealth jumps at
time t = 0 and remains constant from thereon. So we get λ¯ = λ (T −) = λ (T +). Finally,
when the tradable good sector is relatively more capital intensive, a rise in government
spending leaves unaffected the relative price of the non-traded good both in the sort-run
and in the long run, such that P˜ = P (T −) = P (T +). With output constrained at time T
by the capital stock and by the relative price of the non-traded good, it therefore follows
from (176) that for the market-clearing condition to hold, we must have
dI (T ) = dK˙ (T ) = −dGN (T ) = dGN > 0, (177)
where dGN (T ) ≡ GN2 − GN1 ≡ GN0 − GN1 ≡ −dGN . Thus, the non-traded goods market
equilibrium is maintained though the investment in physical capital, K˙ (T ). Since at time
T , government expenditure reverts back to its original level, the investment flow changes
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Figure 2: Permanent Vs. Temporary Increase in Gj - kT > kN
of sign and turns out to be positive as a greater share of the non tradable production (Y N )
may be allocated to investment (I) since the global consumption (CN +GN ) falls.
H Transitional Dynamics after a Rise in GT
In the text, we consider only an increase in GN . In this section, we analyze the effects
of an increase in GT . Hence, we provide details on the dynamics of key variables after
a permanent and temporary rise in GT , considering both cases: kT > kN and kN > kT .
Transitional paths are depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for kT > kN and kN > kT , respectively.
To keep analytical tractability, we assume that labor supply is fixed, i.e. we set σL = 0.
Since these two parameters do no affect qualitatively the results, we further assume that
the non-traded sector is perfectly competitive, i.e. we set µ = 1, and we set the rate of
depreciation of physical capital to zero.
H.1 Long-Run Effects
It is convenient to determine first the long run changes of the real consumption, the stock
of physical capital and the stock of foreign assets following a permanent rise in government
spending on the traded good by differentiating (29) and (95):
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (178a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
≶ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (178b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+BGT ≷ 0 depending on whether kN ≷ kT , (178c)
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where CGT = 0 and KGT = 0. Expressions of the steady-state changes are given by the set
of equations (78) and (79).
We compare the once-for-all jump of the marginal utility of wealth after a permanent
increase in public spending on the traded good with respect to its change after a permanent
rise:
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
= λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0. (179)
We now evaluate the long run changes of key economic variables after a temporary fiscal
shock by differentiating (29) and (95). Since the signs of expressions depend crucially on
the sectoral capital intensities, we consider two cases.
Case kN > kT
When the non-traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroe-
conomic aggregates in the long run are given by:
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (180a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (180b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (180c)
where Cλ¯ < 0, Kλ¯ < 0 (if k
N > kT ), and Bλ¯ < 0.
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial
(given) values K0 and B0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (181a)
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT > 0, (181b)
where Kλ¯ < 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and BGT > 0. From (178b)-(178c), (180b)-(180c), and (181a)-
(181b), we are able to deduce the following inequalities:
K˜perm < K˜1 = K˜temp < K0, (182a)
B˜temp < B0 < B˜perm < B˜1. (182b)
Case kT > kN
When the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive, the variations of macroeco-
nomic aggregates in the long run are given by
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Cλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (183a)
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0, (183b)
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (183c)
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It is interesting to compare the magnitudes of the long run changes in the stock of
international assets between a permanent and a temporary fiscal expansion:
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Bλ¯λGT +BGT R Bλ¯λGT
(
1− e−r?T
)
=
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
. (184)
The key factor that determines the magnitude of the long run change in the stock of foreign
assets is the period of implementation of the government policy. More specifically, there
exists a time T = T˜ for which the two changes are equal which is given by
T˜ = 1
r?
ln
[
−Bλ¯λGT
BGT
]
. (185)
As the fiscal shock is more persistent, i. e. T > T˜ , the external asset position deteriorates
more than after a permanent fiscal shock. We can summarize our results as follows:
B˜temp < B˜perm < B0 if T > T˜ , (186a)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0 if T < T˜ . (186b)
The changes of the period 1 steady-state values K˜1 and B˜1 compared to their initial
(given) values K˜0 and B˜0 are given by :
dK˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0, (187a)
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT ≷ 0, (187b)
where Kλ¯ > 0, Bλ¯ < 0 and BGT > 0. The sign of (187b) is indeterminate but we are able
to determine the length of fiscal shock, denoted by T¯ , for which the steady-state change
(187b) is equal to zero:
T¯ = − 1
r?
ln
[
Bλ¯λGT +BGT
Bλ¯λGT
]
. (188)
The existence of time T¯ relies upon inequality Bλ¯λGT < Bλ¯λGT + BGT < 0 which in turn
implies that the term in square brackets is positive and less than unity. Consequently, we
get the following inequality:
B˜1 ≶ B0 depending on whether T ≷ T¯ . (189)
From (178b)-(178c), (183b)-(183c), (186) and (187a)-(187b), we are able to deduce the
following inequalities:
K0 < K˜1 = K˜temp < K˜perm, (190a)
B˜perm < B˜temp < B0 if T < T˜ , (190b)
B˜temp < B˜perm < B˜0 if T > T˜ , (190c)
where we assume that T˜ < T¯ .
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H.2 Transitional Dynamics after a Permanent Increase in GT
As shown previously, the stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path
in (K,P )-space. The capital stock, the relative price of the non-traded good, and the stock
of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eµ1t, (191a)
P (t) = P˜ + ω12B1e
µ1t, (191b)
B(t) = B˜ +Φ1B1eµ1t, (191c)
where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = − dK˜dGT dG
T ,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
Case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the relative price of the non-traded good
remains affected by a permanent rise in GT , the initial jump of P is given by
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −ω12
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (192)
From the short run static solutions, and by substituting the change in the equilibrium
value of the marginal utility of wealth and the initial jump of P , we get the response of real
consumption at time t = 0:
dC(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
+ CP
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= −
[
1 + αC 1µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
PC
[
1 + αC r
?
(µ2)
2
C˜N
P˜
σCω12
] ,
=
[
1 + αC
1
µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0, (193)
where 0 <
[
1 + αC 1µ2
C˜N
P˜
σCω
1
2
]
< 1. Therefore, we deduce the following inequality
dC˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
= Cλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
<
dC(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (194)
Irrespective of sectoral capital intensities, a rise in GT induces a once-for-all upward jump
of the marginal utility of wealth which reduces real consumption. If kN > kT , the initial
fall of C is moderated by the depreciation in P at time t = 0 and falls by less than in the
long run.
Differentiating solutions (191), with respect to time, one obtains:
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT < 0, (195a)
P˙ (t) = −µ1ω12
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (195b)
B˙(t) = −µ1Φ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (195c)
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where Φ1 < 0 and
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0.
Along the stable adjustment, real consumption decreases:
C˙ = −σCCαC P˙
P
< 0, (196)
where
(
r? − αC P˙
P
)
corresponds to the consumption-based real interest rate. After its
initial depreciation, the relative price of the non-traded good appreciates to revert back to
its initial value. This appreciation lowers the consumption-based real interest rate below
the world interest rate which stimulates real consumption.
Case kT > kN
Differentiating solutions (191), with respect to time, one obtains
K˙(t) = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT > 0, (197a)
P˙ (t) = 0, (197b)
B˙(t) = −µ1Φ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
eµ1tdGT < 0, (197c)
where Φ1 < 0 and
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
> 0.
H.3 Transitional Dynamics after a Temporary Increase in GT
Case kN > kT
By evaluating formal solution for P (t) and differentiating with respect to GT , we get
the initial jump of P
dP (0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ω12
(
1− e−r?T
) dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (198)
By adopting a similar procedure, we obtain the initial response of the investment flow
following a temporary rise in government spending on the traded good :
dI(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
1− e−r?T
) dI(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
< 0. (199)
By differentiating the formal solution (105c) over period 1 for B(t) with respect to time,
remembering that B2/dGT = 0, then evaluating this at t = 0, and differentiating with
respect to GT , we obtain the initial response of the current account following a fiscal
expansion:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
.
The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (103), and the fact that
BGT = −λGT /λB:
−
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT − Φ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λGT
λB
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λGT
λB
]
,
= −BGT e−r
?T . (200)
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Inserting this expression, and remembering that
dB˜
dGT
= Φ1
dK˜
dGT
, we obtain the reaction of
the current account at time t = 0:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1Φ1Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λGT ,
= −e−r?T − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
≶ 0. (201)
The initial current account response is the result of two conflictory forces: (i) a smoothing
effect which deteriorates the current account, and (ii) the negative investment flow which
improves the external asset position. From (201), there exists a critical value of shock’s
length, Tˆ > 0, such that the current account response is zero on impact, i. e. B˙ (0) = 0.
Solving (201) for Tˆ , we get:
Tˆ = 1
r?
ln

1− µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
−µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
 , (202)
where the term in square brackets is higher than one.
The dynamics for K and P over period 1 are derived by taking the time derivative of
equations (105a) and (105b):
K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −µ1 dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT < 0, (203a)
P˙ (t) = µ1ω12
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −ω12µ1
dK˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT > 0, (203b)
where we used the fact that B1/dGT = − dK˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
.
While the P and K go in the same direction as after a permanent rise in GT , differenti-
ation with respect to time of eq. (105c) shows that the current account may change of sign
over period 1:
CA(t) = B˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dGT − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT ≶ 0. (204)
We have now to determine the conditions under which the current account dynamics dis-
plays a non monotonic behavior. Equation (204) reveals that the stock of international
assets reaches a turning point during its transitional adjustment at time Tˆ given by
Tˆ = 1
µ2
ln
[
−µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
er
?T
]
. (205)
The necessary condition for Tˆ > 0, corresponds to:
0 < e−r
?T < −µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
⇔ dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
> 0. (206)
If the fiscal expansion lasts a short period, i. e. T < Tˆ , the current account initially
deteriorates and the stock of foreign assets decreases monotonically until time T . If the
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fiscal expansion lasts a time period longer than Tˆ , the current account initially improves
before reaching a turning point at time Tˆ . Subsequently, the current account deteriorates
until time T .
Once the government policy has been removed at time T , the relative price of the non-
traded good keeps on depreciating and the capital stock converges towards its new lower
steady-state value:
K˙(t) = µ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT < 0, (207a)
P˙ (t) = µ1ω12
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0, (207b)
whereB′1/dGT = B1/dGT > 0. Over period 2, the current account improves unambiguously
as it can be seen from the time derivative of solution (107c):
B˙(t) = µ1Φ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0. (208)
Case kT > kN
If kT > kN , the dynamics for P are flat as after a permanent fiscal expansion since the
constant B2/dGT is zero, i.e. P˙ (t) = 0. The investment flow is positive over period 1
I(t) = K˙(t) = µ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT = −µ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
eµ1tdGT > 0. (209)
Differentiating eq. (105c) with respect to time and remembering that B2/dGT = 0 yields
the transitional path for B(t):
CA(t) = −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
er
?tdGT + µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
eµ1tdGT . (210)
By evaluating this expressions at t = 0, and differentiating with respect to GT , we obtain
the initial response of the current account following a fiscal expansion:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −r?
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
+ µ1Φ1
B1
dGT
.
The expression in brackets can be evaluated by using properties (103), and the fact that
BGT = −λGT /λB:
−
[
dB˜1
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 dK˜1dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
= −
[
Bλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
+BGT − Φ1Kλ¯
dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
]
,
= −
[
λGT
λB
(
1− e−r?T
)
− λGT
λB
]
,
= −BGT e−r
?T . (211)
Inserting expression (211) and remembering that
dB˜
dGT
= Φ1
dK˜
dGT
, we obtain the reaction
of the current account at time t = 0:
dCA(0)
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −e−r?T − µ1Φ1Kλ¯
(
1− e−r?T
)
λGT ,
= −
[
e−r
?T + µ1
dB˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)]
< 0. (212)
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If kT > kN , both the smoothing effect and the positive investment flow lead to a decumula-
tion of foreign assets. Consequently, the current account deteriorates initially and the stock
of internationally traded bonds keeps on decreasing over period 1:
CA(t) = B˙(t) = −e−r?(T −t)dGT − µ1 dB˜dGT
∣∣∣∣
perm
(
1− e−r?T
)
eµ1tdGT < 0. (213)
Over period 2, the stocks of physical capital keeps on decreasing and the current account
deteriorates monotonically:
I(t) = µ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT > 0, (214a)
CA(t) = µ1Φ1
B′1
dGT
eµ1tdGT < 0, (214b)
where B′1/dGT = B1/dGT < 0.
I The Effects of Temporary Fiscal Shocks: The Case of Elas-
tic Labor Supply
In this section, we derive formal solutions by assuming elastic labor supply. Yet, the
derivations of formal solutions are only possible in the case kT > kN since if sectoral
capital intensities are reversed, expressions become analytically untractable.
We first solve the system (82a)-(82c) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ as functions of the marginal utility
of wealth, λ¯ and government spending GN . Totally differentiating equations (82a)-(82c)
yields in matrix form: 
hkkk
N
P 0 0(
Y NP − CNP
)
Y NK 0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?


dP˜
dK˜
dB˜

=

0
− (Y N
λ¯
− CN
λ¯
)
dλ¯+ dGN
− (Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
dλ¯
 . (215)
Steady-state values of K and B can be expressed as functions of the shadow value of
wealth and government spending GN :
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (216a)
B˜ = v
(
λ¯, GN
)
, (216b)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν1
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
)
> 0 if kT > kN , (217a)
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
≷ 0 if kN > kT , (217b)
vλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
r?h˜
[
σC
(
f˜ C˜N + h˜C˜T
)
+ σLL˜h˜f˜
]
< 0, (217c)
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and
KGN ≡
∂K˜
∂GN
=
1
Y NK
=
1
ν1
< 0 if kT > kN , (218a)
=
1
Y NK
=
1
ν2
> 0 if kN > kT , (218b)
vGN ≡
∂B˜
∂GN
= − Y
T
K
Y NK r
?
=
f˜
h˜r?
> 0. (218c)
Adopting the same procedure described in section (K.7), we provide formal expressions
of the constants B1, B2 and B′1 only in the case kT > kN . We were unable to derive useful
formal expressions with the reversal of capital intensities. Yet, in the latter case, analytical
results derived by assuming inelastic labor supply are in line with numerical results and
thereby elastic labor supply does not affect qualitatively the results.
Case kT > kN
The solutions after a rise in GN are:
B1
dGN
= −
[
σC
(
P˜ C˜Ne−r?T + C˜T
)
− σLL˜P˜
(
ν2k˜
N + ν1k˜T e−r
?T
)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ,
= −
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+
(
1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T ν1 − σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ≷ 0, (219a)
B2
dGN
= 0, (219b)
B′1
dGN
=
B1
dGN
+KGN e
−ν1T
= −
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) (
1− e−ν1T )+ (1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T ν1 − σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ≷ 0,(219c)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= λGN
(
1− e−r?T
)
> 0, (219d)
where λGN represents the change in the equilibrium value of the shadow value of wealth
after a permanent increase in GN (see eq. (92b)).
General solutions for K and P are:
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (220a)
P (t)− P˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (220b)
Differentiating eq. (220a) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of investment following a temporary rise in government
spending on the non-traded good:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= ν1
B1
dGN
+ ν2
B2
dGN
.
Substituting (219a) and using the fact that B2dGN = 0, the initial reaction of investment
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rewrites as:
dI(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −ν1
[(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
+
(
1− e−r?T ) P˜ (σLL˜k˜T ν1 − σCC˜N)]
ν1
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
) ,
= −
1 + (1− e−r?T)
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≶ 0. (221)
Eq. (221) corresponds to eq. (22) in the text
The general solution for the stock of foreign assets is given by:
B(t) = B˜ +
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (222)
Differentiating eq. (222) w.r.t. time, evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating w.r.t.
GN , we obtain the initial response of the current account after a temporary rise in GN :
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= r?
[(
B0 − B˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
ν1
B1Φ1
dGN
+ ν2
B2Φ2
dGN
.
Using the fact that
− dB˜1
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
− Φ1 B1dGN − Φ2B2
= −
{[
(Bλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯)
dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
+ (BGN − Φ1KGN )
]}
,
=
λGN
λB
e−r
?T = − P˜
r?
e−r
?T , (223)
the initial reaction of the current account rewrites as:
dCA(0)
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
= −P˜ e−r?T − ν1P˜ B1dGN ,
= P˜
(
1− e−r?T
)1 +
(
σLL˜k˜
T P˜ ν1 − σC P˜ C˜N
)
(
σCPCC˜ + σLW˜ L˜
)
 ≷ 0, (224)
where we used the fact that Φ1 = −P˜ . Eq. (224) corresponds to eq. (23) in the text.
J Savings
Since the current account can be alternatively expressed as net exports plus interest earnings
from traded bond holding, or as the savings less investment, we provide details for the
derivation of steady-state and dynamic effects of fiscal shocks on savings.
J.1 Formal Solution for Financial Wealth
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = A˙(t)) is given by:
A˙(t) = r?A(t) +W (P )L
(
λ¯, P
)− PC (P )C (λ¯, P )− Z, (225)
with Z = GT + PGN .
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The linearized version of (225) writes as follows:
A˙(t) = r?
(
A(t)− A˜
)
+M
(
P (t)− P˜
)
, (226)
with M given by
M =
(
WP L˜+ W˜LP
)
−
(
C˜N + PCCP +GN
)
,
= L˜WP (1 + σL)−
[
C˜N (1− σC) +GN
]
,
= −
{
K˜ (ν2 + δK) +
[
σLL˜k˜
T (ν2 + δK)− σCC˜N
]}
< 0. (227)
From the second line of (227), if σC < 1 as empirical studies suggest, then the term
in square brackets is positive and M is negative. The last line has been computed by
using the fact that L˜ = L˜N + L˜T and K˜ = k˜T L˜T + k˜N L˜N which allows to simplify
1
µ
[
Y˜ N + L˜k˜T (ν2 + δK)µ
]
to K˜ (ν2 + δK).
The general solution for the stock of financial wealth writes as follows:
A(t) = A˜+
[(
A0 − A˜
)
− Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?B1 −
Mω22
ν2 − r?B2
]
er
?t +
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t +
Mω22
ν2 − r?B2e
ν1t.
(228)
Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:
A(t) = A˜+
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t, (229)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
A˜−A0 = Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (230)
J.2 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Permanent Fiscal Shock
Differentiating (230) w. r. t. Gi (i = T,N), long-term changes of financial wealth are given
by:
dA˜
dτ j
=
ω12
ν2
(
K˜ν2 + σLL˜k˜T ν2 − σCC˜N
) dK˜
dGi
. (231)
Differentiating (229) w. r. t. Gi (i = T,N), we get the dynamics of savings:
S(t) = A˙(t) = ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?
B1
dGi
dGieν1t, (232)
where B1dGi = −
dK˜
dGi .
J.3 Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of a Temporary Fiscal Shock
We now evaluate the transitional dynamics of saving after a temporary shock, dGi (i =
T,N).
Case kN > kT
Over the unstable period 1, savings evolve as follows:
S(t) = A˙(t) = r?
[(
A0 − A˜1
)
− Mω
1
2
ν1 − r?B1
]
er
?t + ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?B1e
ν1t, (233)
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with (
A0 − A˜1
)
=
(
B0 − B˜1
)
+ P˜0
(
K0 − K˜1
)
+K0
(
P0 − P˜1
)
. (234)
Over the stable period 2, savings evolve as follows:
S(t) = A˙(t) = ν1
Mω12
ν1 − r?B
′
1e
ν1t. (235)
To compute the long-term changes of financial wealth, we linearize its expression, i. e.
A(t) = B(t) + P (t)K(t) in the neighborhood of the final steady-state:
A(t)− A˜2 =
(
B(t)− B˜2
)
+ P˜
(
K(t)− K˜2
)
+ K˜
(
P (t)− P˜2
)
Then we evaluate at time t = 0:
A0 − A˜2 =
(
B0 − B˜2
)
+ P˜0
(
K0 − K˜2
)
+ K˜0
(
P (0)− P˜2
)
,
where we used the fact that A(0) = A0, B(0) = B0, K(0) = K0 and assumed that the small
open economy starts initially from the steady-state, i. e. A0 = A˜0 = A˜, B0 = B˜0 = B˜,
K0 = K˜0 = K˜. Substituting P (0)−P˜2 = ω12B1 into the expression above and differentiating
w.r.t Gi (i = T,N), long-term changes of financial wealth are given by:
dA˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (236a)
dA˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (236b)
with (
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
)
= −σCPCC˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (237)
Case kT > kN
Since ω12 = 0 whenever the traded good sector is relatively more capital intensive, and
because B2/dGi = 0, the transitional dynamics for saving degenerate and the financial
wealth jumps immediately to its new steady-state level.
Adopting a similar procedure than previously (i. e. in the case kN > kT ), we can
calculate the long-term changes of financial wealth as follows:
dA˜
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGT
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (238a)
dA˜
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
=
(
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯
) dλ¯
dGN
∣∣∣∣
temp
< 0, (238b)
with
Bλ¯ + P˜Kλ¯ = −
σCPCC˜
λ¯r?
< 0. (239)
K The Case of Endogenous Markup
The framework builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008]. While we consider the case of an
endogenous markup, it holds for an exogenous markup, though in the latter case the number
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of competitors is large enough so that the price-elasticity of demand is not affected by firm
entry. There are two sectors in the economy: a perfectly competitive sector which produces
a traded good denoted by the superscript T and an imperfectly competitive sector which
produces a non-traded good denoted by the superscript N . We assume that each producer
of a unique variety of the non-traded good has the following technology XNj = H (Kj ,Lj)
with Kj the capital stock and Lj labor.
K.1 Framework
The final non-traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral
non-traded goods:
Y N =
[∫ 1
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 , (240)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral
goods and QNj stands for intermediate consumption of sector’j variety (with j ∈ [0, N ]).
The final good producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for
both consumption and investment.
In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral non-traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non-traded
output sectoral good j writes as:44
QNj = N−
1
²−1
[∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di] ²²−1 , (241)
where XNi,j stands for output of firm i in sector j and ² is the elasticity of substitution
between any two varieties.
Denoting by P and Pj the relative price of the final good and of the jth variety of the
intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:
ΠN = P
[∫ N
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 − ∫ 1
0
PjQNj dj. (242)
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand
function for each input:
QNj =
(Pj
P
)−ω
Y N , (243)
and the price of the final output is given by:
P =
(∫ 1
0
P1−ωj dj
) 1
1−ω
. (244)
where Pj is the price index of sector j and P is the price of the final good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one
variety XNi,j is a price setter. Intermediate output XNi,j is produced using capital KNi,j and
labor LNi,j :
XNi,j = H
(KNi,j ,LNi,j) . (245)
44By having the term N−
1
²−1 in (241), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates
solely on the effects of markup variation.
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Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the profit function for the jth sector
good producer denoted by piNj is:
piNj ≡ PjN−
1
²−1
(∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di) ²²−1 − ∫ N
0
Pi,jXNi,jdi. (246)
The demand faced by each producer XNi,j is defined as :
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−² QNj
N
, (247)
and the price index of sector j is given by:
Pj = N−
1
1−²
(∫ N
0
P1−²i,j di
) 1
1−²
. (248)
Combining (243) and (247), the demand for variety XNi,j can be expressed in terms of
the relative price of the final non-traded good:
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−²(Pj
P
)−ω Y N
N
. (249)
In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a fixed cost denoted by
FC measured in terms of the final good which is assumed to be symmetric across firms.
Each firm j chooses capital and labor to maximize profits. The profit function for the ith
producer in sector j denoted by piNi,j is:
piNi,j ≡ PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − pFC. (250)
The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-
adjusted marginal revenues of capital PjHKµ and labor
PjHL
µ , to the capital rental rate r
K
and the producer wage W , respectively.
K.2 First-Order Conditions
The current-value Hamiltonian for the j-th firm’s optimization problem in the non-traded
sector writes as follows:
HNj = PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj −WLNj − pFC + ηj [H (KNj ,LNj )−XNi,j] , (251)
where XNj stands for the demand for variety j; firm j chooses its price %j to maximize
profits treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non-traded sector
write as follows:
PjHK + ηHK = rK , , (252a)
PjHL + ηHL = W, (252b)
ηj = P ′jHj , (252c)
Combining (252a)-(252b) with (252c), by assuming that firms j are symmetric, yields:
PjHK
(
1− 1
ej
)
= rK , (253a)
PjHL
(
1− 1
ej
)
=W, (253b)
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where we used the fact that
P′j
PjXNi,j
= − 1ej .
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector
produce the output level XNi,j = XN with the same quantities of labor LNi,j = LN and
capital KNi,j = KN . Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are
KN = NKN and LN = NLN , respectively. They also set the same price Pi,j = P. Hence,
eqs. (244) and (248) imply that P = P .
Defining the markup µ = ee−1 , first-order conditions rewrite as follows:
P
HK
µ
= rK , (254a)
P
HL
µ
=W. (254b)
We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into
account the influence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (255)
As it will be useful later, we calculate expressions of the partial derivatives of the price-
elasticity of demand and the markup with respect to the number of firms:
eN =
∂e
∂N
=
²− ω
N2
> 0, µN =
∂µ
∂N
= − eN
(e− 1)2 = −
eN
e− 1
µ
e
< 0, (256)
where we let µ = ee−1 .
We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in every non-traded sector
at each instant of time. Using constant returns to scale in production, i. e. X = H (K,L) =
HKK +HLL, and the zero profit condition, in the aggregate, we have
PH
(
KN , LN
)− rKKN −WLN − PNFC = 0. (257)
Substituting the short-run static solution for non-traded output (39), the zero-profit con-
dition (257) can be rewritten as:
Y N
(
K,P, λ¯, µ (N)
)(
1− 1
µ (N)
)
= NFC. (258)
K.3 Short-Run Static Solution for the Number of Firms
The zero profit condition can be solved for the number of producers in the non-traded
sector:
N = N
(
K,P, λ¯
)
, (259)
with partial derivatives given by:
Nx ≡ ∂N
∂x
= −Y
N
x ωFC
χ
≷ 0, (260)
where x = K,P, λ¯, ωFC ≡ NFC/Y N stands for the share of fixed costs in markup adjusted
output and we set
χ =
Y N
N
{[
ηY N ,µ (µ− 1) + 1
] ηµ,N
µ
− ωFC
}
, (261)
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Inspection of (261) shows that χ < 0 if ηµ,N is not too large. This implies that an input
inflow ion the non-traded sector that raises Y N and thereby yields to profit opportunities
stimulates entry of firms.
K.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions for non-traded output and consumption, given by (39)
and (31) respectively, into the non-traded good market-clearing condition (18), and inserting
short-run static solution for capital-labor ratio in the non-traded good sector (33) into the
dynamic equation for the real exchange rate (5d), and substituting the short-run static
solution for the number of firms (259) yields:
K˙ =
Y N {K,P, µ [N (K,P )]}
µ [N (K,P )]
− CN (P )− δKK −GN , (262a)
P˙ = P
{
r? + δK −
hk
(
kN {p, µ [N (K,P )]})
µ [N (K,P )]
}
. (262b)
For clarity purpose, we dropped variables which are constant over time from short-run
static solutions.
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, P˜ the
long-term values of x = K, p, we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, P˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, P (t)− P˜
)T
, (263)
where J is given by
J ≡
 b11 b12
b21 b22
 , (264)
with
b11 =
Y N
µ
[
Y NK
Y N
− µN
µ
NK
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− δK , (265a)
b12 =
Y N
µ
[
Y NP
Y N
− µN
µ
NP
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− cNp , (265b)
b21 =
P
µ
hkk
µNNK
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)
, (265c)
b22 = −P
µ
hkk
[
kNp −
µNNp
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
, (265d)
Equilibrium Dynamics
The sing of the determinant denoted by Det of the 2 × 2 Jacobian matrix (264) is
ambiguous:
Det J = b11b22 − b12b21
=
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)[
Y TK
P˜
+
P
µ
hkkk
N µNNp
µ
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
−µN
µ
NK
[
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
Y TK
P˜
+
(
Y NP
µ
− CNP
)
P
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,(266)
84
and the trace denoted by Tr given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
Y TK
µ
+
Y NK
P
− δK
−µN
µ
[
NK
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
−NP P
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,
= r? − µN
µ
NK
Y N
µ
> 0, (267)
where we used the fact that Y
T
K
µ +
Y NK
P =
hk
µ = r
? + δK ; the positive sign follows from
NK > 0 and µN < 0. If the elasticity of the markup to the flow of entry is not too large,
the determinant (266) is negative so that the condition for saddle-path stability with real-
valued roots holds. Such a condition requires that the markup must be initially not too
large.
Characteristic roots from J write as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
Tr J±
√
(Tr J)2 − 4Det J
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (268)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (269)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, P , the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
General solutions are those described by (55) with eigenvector ωi2 associated with eigen-
value µi given by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (270)
K.5 Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (21) around the steady-state:
B˙(t) = r?
(
B(t)− B˜
)
+
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
] (
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[(
Y TP + Y
T
µ µNNP
)− CTP ] (P (t)− P˜) .
(271)
where CTP is given by (32b).
Using the fact that P (t)− P˜ = ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, setting
N1 =
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
]
+
[(
Y TP + Y
T
µ µNNP
)− CTP ]ω12, (272)
solving for the differential equation and invoking the transversality condition for intertem-
poral solvency, the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
B(t)− B˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (273)
and the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
B˜ −B0 = Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
(274)
where we substituted B1 ≡ K0 − K˜.
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K.6 Solutions for L, N , and W
Linearizing the short-run static solution N = N (K,P ) yields the solution for the number
of firms:
N(t) = N˜ +NK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+NP
(
P (t)− P˜
)
,
= N˜ +
(
NK +NPω12
)
B1e
ν1t +
(
NK +NPω22
)
B2e
ν2t. (275)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for labor L = L (P, µ), using the fact that
µ = µ (N), and substituting the appropriate solutions, the solution for L(t) reads:
L(t) = L˜+ LP
(
P (t)− P˜
)
+ Lµ (µ(t)− µ˜) , (276)
= L˜+ LP
[
ω12 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω12
)]
B1e
ν1t + LP
[
ω22 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω22
)]
B1e
ν2t,(277)
where we used the fact that Lµ = −LPPµ .
Linearizing the short-run static solution for the wage rate W =W (P, µ) and substitut-
ing appropriate solutions yields:
W (t) = W˜ +WPω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+WµµN
(
N(t)− N˜
)
,
= W˜ +WP
[
ω12 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω12
)]
B1e
ν1t +WP
[
ω22 −
P˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +NPω22
)]
B2e
ν2t,(278)
where we used the fact that Wµ = −WPPµ .
K.7 The Two-Step Procedure: Wealth Effect and Tax Effects
By analytical convenience, we rewrite the system of steady-state equations, assuming that
δK = 0:
hk
[
kN
(
P˜
)]
µ
= r?, (279a)
1
µ
Y N
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CN
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GN = 0, (279b)
r?B˜ + Y T
(
K˜, P˜ , λ¯
)
− CT
(
λ¯, P˜
)
−GT = 0, (279c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
B˜ −B0
)
= Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (279d)
where K0 and B0 correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and
foreign assets.
Derivation of Steady-State Functions
In a first step, we solve the system (279a)-(279c) for P˜ , K˜ and B˜ as functions of the
marginal utility of wealth, λ¯, government spending GN together with the mark-up. Totally
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differentiating equations (279a)-(279c) yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
P 0 0(
Y NP
µ − CNP
)
Y NK
µ 0(
Y TP − CTP
)
Y TK r
?


dP˜
dK˜
dB˜

=

Y NK
µ dµ
−
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − CNλ¯
)
dλ¯−
(
Y Nµ
µ − Y
N
µ2
)
dµ+ dGN
− (Y T
λ¯
− CT
λ¯
)
dλ¯− Y Tµ dµ
 , (280)
where we used the fact that µf = P
[
h− hk
(
kN − kT )] and hkµ = r? at the steady-state to
rewrite r? − hkkkNµ as h˜µ(k˜N−k˜T ) =
Y NK
µ .
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯, government spending GN and
the markup µ determine the following steady-state values:
P˜ = P (µ) , (281a)
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, GN , µ
)
, (281b)
B˜ = B
(
λ¯, GN , µ
)
, (281c)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν1
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν1
)
> 0 if kT > kN , (282a)
= − 1
λ¯
1
ν2
(
σCC˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)
> 0 if kN > kT , (282b)
Bλ¯ ≡
∂B˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
r?h˜
[
σC
(
f˜ C˜N + h˜C˜T
)
+ σLL˜h˜f˜
]
< 0, (282c)
and
KGN ≡
∂K˜
∂GN
=
1
Y NK /µ
=
1
ν1
< 0 if kT > kN , (283a)
=
1
Y NK /µ
=
1
ν2
> 0 if kN > kT , (283b)
BGN ≡
∂B˜
∂GN
= − Y
T
Kµ
Y NK r
?
=
f˜
h˜r?
> 0. (283c)
and
Pµ ≡ ∂P˜
∂µ
= − P˜
µ
P˜Y NK
µY TK
= − P˜ ν1
µν2
> 0, if kT > kN , (284a)
= − P˜ ν2
µν1
> 0, if kN > kT , (284b)
Kµ ≡ ∂K˜
∂µ
=
P˜
µν1ν2
[
Y NP
µ
− ν1CNP
]
+
Y N
µ2ν1
< 0, if kT > kN , (284c)
=
P˜
µν1ν2
[
Y NP
µ
− ν2CNP
]
+
Y N
µ2ν2
≶ 0, if kN > kT , (284d)
Bµ ≡ ∂B˜
∂µ
= − P˜
µν2
[
P˜
(
Y NP
µ
r?
ν1
− CNP
)
+
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν1 − ν1
r?
σCC˜
N
)]
+
L˜N f˜
µr?
≷ 0,
if kT > kN (284e)
= − P˜
µν1
[
P˜
(
Y NP
µ
r?
ν2
− CNP
)
+
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν2 − ν2
r?
σCC˜
N
)]
+
L˜N f˜
µr?
≷ 0,
if kN > kT (284f)
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where we used the fact that hkkkNP = − µP
Y TK
P to derive the first equality of (284a). In
addition, we made use of the following property Y Nµ = −Pµ Y NP and Y Tµ = −Pµ Y TP to
determine (284c)-(284d) and (284e)-(284f). Finally, use has been made of property (42a)
to rewrite Y TP − CTP and property (42b) to simplify µY TK + µY NK which is equal to P˜µr? in
the long-run.
Since the change in the markup modifies the long-run levels of real consumption and
labor supply through the steady-state change in the relative price of non tradables, it is
convenient to write their steady-state functions by substituting into their static solutions
(29) that hold in the long-run:
C = m
(
λ¯, µ
)
, L = n
(
λ¯, µ
)
, (285)
where partial derivatives are given by (30) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we
substitute respectively the notations m and n for C and L) and
mµ ≡ ∂C˜
∂µ
= αCσCC˜
ν1
ν2
< 0, if kT > kN , (286a)
= αCσCC˜
ν2
ν1
< 0, if kN > kT , (286b)
nµ ≡ ∂L˜
∂µ
= −σLL˜k˜
T
W˜
P˜ h˜
f˜
P˜ r?
µ2
< 0. (286c)
We computed (286c) as follows: nµ = σLL˜k˜
T
W˜
P˜Y NK
µY TK
P˜ r?
µ .
Following the same procedure, i. e. substituting the steady-state function for the real
exchange rate into the static solution for wage evaluated at the steady-state, the steady-
state function for wage writes as follows:
W =W (µ) , (287)
where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
Wµ ≡ ∂W˜
∂µ
= −k˜T P˜ h˜
f˜
P˜ r?
µ2
< 0, (288)
where Wµ = k˜T
P˜Y NK
µY TK
P˜ r?
µ with
Y NK
Y TK
= − h˜
f˜
< 0.
Finally, following a similar procedure, we may express the rental rate of physical capital
as a function of µ:
rK = rK (µ) , (289)
where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? P˜
µ
ν1
ν2
> 0, if kT > kN , (290)
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? P˜
µ
ν2
ν1
> 0, if kN > kT . (291)
Derivation of the Equilibrium Value of the Marginal Utility of Wealth
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯ by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (279d):
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯ = − [vGN − Φ1KGN ] dGN , (292)
88
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯ as a function of tax rates:
λ¯ = λ
(
GN
)
, (293)
with
λGN ≡
∂λ¯
∂GN
= − [vGN − Φ1KGN ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
. (294)
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